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ABSTRACT
This study investigates how the different ideological interpretations of the
principle of neutrality affect the practices of humanitarian aid organizations in conflict
situations. Specifically, I study the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
and Médicins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders/MSF). Additionally, I seek
specific examples from the current conflict in Darfur, Sudan to illustrate my findings.
The purpose of this study is to determine how the organizations deal with
delivering aid in a highly politicized environment while maintaining neutrality. It seeks
to articulate the current dilemmas facing aid organizations that work to save the lives of
those who suffer. Understanding the manner in which neutrality impacts practice is an
essential step in the process of determining the most effective and humanitarian means of
delivering aid.
I interview staff members at the ICRC and MSF and collect operational reports
from each organization. I conduct a qualitative analysis of the interviews and documents
by coding the information according to six categories: 1) Neutrality, 2) Coordination and
Collaboration, 3) Political Factors, 4) Unintended Consequences of Aid, 5) Genocide,
and 6) Human Rights. After the information is separated in these themes, I search for
emergent themes in the data and articulate the policy dilemmas that arise.
I find that organizations identify neutrality as simply not taking sides in a conflict.
The manner in which neutrality impacts practices depends on the goals and mission of the
organization. This study demonstrates that humanitarian aid organizations consistently
struggle with the question of how neutrality should impact practice. ICRC adheres more
strictly to the principle of neutrality because of its international mandate to promote
international humanitarian law and its dependency on access to victims to fulfill this
mandate. There are two main schools of thought regarding neutrality within MSF. There
are those who assert that MSF should maintain neutrality to the same extent as ICRC; and
there are those who argue that MSF should take the role of public advocate for victims by
denouncing abusive practices.
I conclude that neutrality impacts practice, depending in part on the organization’s
goals, by enhancing the level of organizational responsibility for aid’s impact,
minimizing its coordination with other aid agencies, states or international organizations,
and either eliminating the freedom to denounce abusive practices or causing dilemmas
within organizations over whether or not to publicly denounce the parties to a conflict.
Neutrality is more often a pragmatic means to an end rather than a theoretical ideal.
Additionally, the neutrality of an organization depends not only on its intention but also
on how it is perceived by the parties to the conflict.

v

I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of neutrality has guided humanitarian action since the 19th century.
The notion of neutrality is grounded in the long tradition of dualism, characteristic of
early Western political theorists. This tradition of dualism is expressed in the theology of
St. Augustine, as the notion of a fallen world and the separation of that fallen world from
the City of God (Warner 1999: 2). Because this world is fallen, the tradition goes, human
beings are restricted in what they can accomplish without divine intervention. Any solely
human action, therefore, is inherently incomplete and flawed (Warner 1999: 2).
The concept of dualism is pervasive in the humanitarian effort to separate war and
violence from humanitarian assistance. This effort is most prevalent in the creation of a
“humanitarian space” as an apolitical area in the midst of a war, where non-combatants
could be free from harm and aid organizations could attend to the victims. According to
this world view, war or any other extension of the political is tainted because the very
world in which it occurs is fallen. Thus, in order to maintain the purity of humanitarian
action, it must be completely devoid of the political affairs of the world (Warner 1999:
2).
This research seeks to illuminate the manner in which an organization’s
ideological interpretation of the principle of neutrality impacts its practice in conflict
situations. Neutrality means to refrain from taking sides in a conflict or from acting in a
way that furthers the interests of one party over the other. Specifically, how does a
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strictly neutral organization administer aid differently than an organization with a more
fluid definition of neutrality?
To assess the impact of neutrality on organizational practice and to determine if
neutrality is an appropriate principle for humanitarian aid organizations, one must
understand its origins. The concept prevailed in Europe during the19th century when
there was a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants and wars were
fought between professional armies on a designated battlefield. Neutrality, in this age,
pertained to a third party arbitrator who was called upon to work out problems when one
side violated the rules of war. Henceforth, neutrality became an important component of
international law. Under international law, a sovereign state could declare its neutrality
when other states were at war. This declaration required the neutral state to remain
“strictly impartial towards the belligerent parties, refraining from any official act that
favored one side over the other” (Terry 2000: 1). The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) proposed that this idea of neutrality, as understood in international
law, be extended to impartial humanitarian organizations.
Unlike the time when neutrality first emerged as a component of humanitarian
aid, today’s conflicts are more often internal as opposed to international. Additionally,
contemporary conflicts tend to involve “ideological, economic, religious, and political
stakes that are played out in urban, rural, populated and unpopulated arenas alike” (Terry
2000: 2). According to former director of research for Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors
without Borders/MSF), Fiona Terry, humanitarian action can never be neutral in
situations of total war, when the primary objective of war is to kill the members of the
2

other side. In such a conflict, neutral intentions of the organization, whether expressed
through action or inaction, have political implications because they impact this objective
(Terry 2000: 3).
Aid organizations questioned the value of neutrality while assisting suffering
populations during the Biafran famine in 1968 (Chandler 2001: 683). This famine
occurred in Southeastern Nigeria as a result of the war for independence waged by the
Biafran people against the government. It was the first real test of efficiency and ability
for humanitarian non governmental organizations (NGOs) because it was the first case in
which NGOs were responsible for the majority of the humanitarian aid effort.
Additionally, it was the first case that provoked a split between the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other major NGOs over the nature of neutrality
in humanitarian action (Chandler 2001: 684).
The Biafran famine was the first African famine to receive extensive news
coverage in the West. This exposure generated criticism that characterized Great
Britain’s support of the Nigerian government as “complicit in genocide by starvation”
(Chandler 2001: 684). Several NGOs working in the region argued that the only ethical
option was to solely assist the Biafran population, thus withholding humanitarian
resources from the contending federal party. During this crisis, the ICRC maintained its
neutrality despite efforts by other NGOs to take a public stand condemning the Nigerian
government on behalf of the Biafran population.
As evident from this example, depending on an organization’s mission, neutrality
can mean various things in practice. The ICRC is the guardian of international
3

humanitarian law and in order to fulfill this mandate, it must have access to the victims of
a conflict and be able to talk to the authorities and belligerents. ICRC strictly adheres to
the principle of neutrality because it sees neutrality as an operational tool for securing
access to victims and maintaining dialogue with belligerents. Thus, in Biafra, the ICRC
did not speak publicly about the Nigerian government’s responsibility for the Biafran
peoples’ suffering. Additionally, neutrality necessitates obtaining permission from local
authorities before intervening in a conflict zone. Thus, ICRC waited until the
government gave it permission to intervene before beginning aid operations.
A disagreement over how to respond to the Biafran situation led French doctor
and ICRC member, Bernard Kouchner, to resign from the ICRC and found Médecins
sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders/MSF) in 1971. Kouchner declared that the
ICRC’s silence during the Biafran famine made its workers “accomplices in the
systematic massacre of a population” (Benthal 1993: 125). Furthermore, according to
MSF, waiting for permission from those who may be responsible for the suffering
compromises the humanitarian imperative to save lives. Thus, MSF started a new type of
humanitarian organization without borders. Since its commencement MSF’s work has
been characterized by some of its staff as representative of the new humanitarian efforts
(125).
The division between the traditional and new humanitarian approach was affirmed
during the 1990s when severe human rights abuses in Rwanda, Kosovo, Srebrenica and
elsewhere, presented unprecedented challenges to aid organizations’ neutrality. When
tensions arise between strictly adhering to principles and acting in the best interest of the
4

victims, the diverse mass of aid organizations respond very differently. Despite reported
divergent perspectives between the ICRC and MSF, both organizations claim to operate
according to the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence.
In this research, I examine the policies and practices of ICRC and MSF through
an inductive study using in-depth interviews with the organizations’ staff and document
analysis of their reports. I chose these organizations because they are consistently
referred to as leaders on opposite sides of the debate over neutrality in literature on the
topic of humanitarian aid. I examine the organizations’ practices in conflict situations,
using examples from the current Darfur conflict in Western Sudan. First, I review
pertinent literature on the topic of humanitarian aid and the principle of neutrality.
Second, I provide a description of the ICRC and MSF, including their mission, structure
and relationship to the United Nations (UN). Third, I provide a brief background to the
Darfur conflict and comment on its relevance to this study. Fourth, I explain the research
methodology used to acquire the data which I report in the proximate section. Next, I
offer conclusions and highlight the policy implications that these conclusions support.
Finally, I discuss the limitations of the research and emerging ideas for future research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature reviewed discusses how aid organizations’ policies on neutrality
work in practice. Specifically, it addresses dilemmas that arise when aid organizations
operate in a politicized environment and face the possibility of their aid being misused or
having unintended consequences. Additionally, the literature posits that coordinating aid
5

efforts with military operations could mitigate the unintended negative effects of aid.
Finally, it addresses the various attempts to form international guidelines, in the form of
international humanitarian law and UN resolutions, to structure humanitarian aid
responses in conflict situations.

Unintended Consequences.
I focus my research on humanitarian aid in violent civil conflict because this is the
predominant form of conflict in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, civil conflicts pose a
particular set of dilemmas for aid agencies because the organizations have to operate so
close to the fighting, thus pushing the humanitarian space right up against the politicized
environment in which it occurs. Some of the literature questions the ability of neutral
organizations to achieve their goals amidst violent civil conflicts. In the article
“Collateral Damage,” Sarah Lischer (2003), a political scientist, explores the possibility
that aid cannot be neutral (81). Lischer notes that even though organizations claim to
operate in a neutral manner, they cannot assume that the impact is also neutral. If all
members of an organization assume that its aid can not have a biased effect, Lischer
suggests that “group think” emerges and causes organizations to overlook possible
biased, and often negative, effects of aid (2003: 81). To emphasize her point, Lischer
denotes four ways in which humanitarian aid can actually exacerbate the conflict. Aid
can feed militants, sustain or protect the militants’ supporters, contribute to the war
economy, and provide legitimacy to combatants (Lischer 2003: 83-86). Feeding militants
can occur unintentionally when militants hide among refugee populations undetected; or
6

it can be intentional when organizations strictly interpret and follow the principle of
impartiality. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) legitimizes
feeding militants saying that, “[E]ven the guilty need to be fed” (Lischer 2003: 83). This
understanding of impartiality differs from other aid organizations that adhere to the
principle but only assist non-combatants intentionally.
Contributing to the war economy is an unintended but often unavoidable result of
humanitarian aid. Refugee leaders often take “a portion of all rations and salaries” and
“control the distribution process.” The secretary general of MSF recognized this pattern
in the Rwandan refugee camps in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
saying “food represents power, and camp leaders who control its distribution divert
considerable quantities toward war preparations.” The ICRC experienced this misuse of
its humanitarian resources in Zaire, reporting that:
The level of diversion by the factions had reached a systematic and planned level, that
was integrated into the war strategy. . . It had become obvious that the factions were
opening the door to humanitarian aid, up to the point where all the sophisticated logistics
had entered the zones: cars, radios, computers, telephones. When all the stuff was there,
then the looting would start in a quite systematic way (Lischer 2003: 84).

Lischer asserts that regardless of the portion of the war economy that is generated
thorough the misappropriation of aid, organizations have a responsibility to lessen this
effect. Ideas about responsibility, as they apply to humanitarian aid organizations, are
fundamentally linked to understanding of the purpose and limits of humanitarian action.
For some, responsibility may mean that the organization is accountable for the impact of
their aid. For others it is limited to alleviating suffering in the short term, while still
others advocate incorporating aspects of conflict management into aid operations (Terry
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2002: 18). Lisher asserts that aid agencies should take responsibility for their impact by
working to prevent unintended negative consequences. The stolen resources not only
promote the war effort, but they decrease the resources available to the suffering
populations, so “absolute,” or that which is taken to support the war effort, as well as
“relative,” or that which is not received and used by the victims, must be considered
(Lisher 2003 84). Furthermore, if the stolen food, medicine and other supplies are not
sold, they provide the militants the added benefit of physical strength, while contributing
to the degradation of the health of the civilian refugees.
The unintended consequence of providing legitimacy to combatants occurs when
the recipients of aid assume that those in charge of distributing it are also providing it.
Thus, combatants who seize control of humanitarian resources gain legitimacy as
responsible leaders who are providing for civilian needs (85).
The unintended, negative consequences of aid present a dilemma for neutral
organizations. Depending on the organization’s understanding of neutrality and how it
impacts practice, it may assume that its responsibility ends after the distribution of aid or
it may take responsibility for the long-term impact of its aid on the conflict situation.
This research will examine how neutral aid agencies deal with the potential for an
unintended, biased impact. It is relevant because organizations can distribute aid with
neutral intentions, but if aid is misappropriated and becomes political because it enhances
the power of one group over the other- is the organization still neutral?
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Collaboration and Coordination
Several articles and books explore the possibilities of how unintended negative
consequences, such as feeding militants, sustaining or protecting the militants’
supporters, contributing to the war economy, and providing legitimacy to combatants, can
be mitigated. Chester Crocker (2001) suggests that collaborative intervention by a
coalition of states and NGOs using both military intervention and humanitarian assistance
is the most effective way to mitigate the potential for negative consequences of aid. For
example, if a state government is unable or unwilling to impose order, then aid is more
likely to be looted and used to empower one group. Collaborative intervention,
according to Crocker, requires political, military and humanitarian actors to coordinate
their efforts. If a state imposes political order and a military enforces it, then
humanitarian aid agencies would be able to ensure that aid went to the intended
recipients. Crocker summarizes this point saying that “hard and soft” powers are
interdependent and “an awareness of what they all share is the beginning of wisdom”
(2001: 236). This awareness, according to Crocker, must continue after intervention
occurs so that each intervening group can collectively work to promote conflict
resolution.
The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR), a
commission that explored the possible reasons for an ineffective humanitarian response
during the Rwandan genocide, found evidence of a disjointed relationship between
humanitarian and military aid. Its research states that “humanitarian action in Rwanda
9

was used as a substitute for, rather than alongside, political and military action,” by the
UN Security Council (Houghton, 2004: 22). This lack of coherence between
humanitarian action and political and military intervention has encouraged support for a
more integrative approach to providing aid during conflict. This notion of integrating
state, military and humanitarian response threatens the neutrality of aid organizations that
would be working in conjunction with highly political entities.
Two academics in the field, Smillie and Minear (2003: 2) summarized the
changes in Western perspective of humanitarian motivated military intervention
following the Cold War:
National Sovereignty has lost much of its sanctity and sovereign authorities have more
widely accepted humanitarian and human rights obligations. There is more discussion
about, if not significantly more resources devoted to, the prevention of conflict.
Interactions between humanitarian activities and political-military strategies have
increased. Effective humanitarian action is now seen variously as a complement to
political objectives and as a substitute for political action at the preventive and even
remedial stages of protracted emergencies (Smille and Minear 2003:2).

The Active Learning Network and Accountability Project for Humanitarian
Action (ALNAP), is a research group made up of member agencies that conduct research
on humanitarian aid and share the evaluations with the other members. The ALNAP
report for 2004 asserts that the integration response to conflict assumes that the objectives
of aid, diplomacy and military are compatible, or that foreign policy is humanitarian
(Houghton 2004: 23). Some political scientists in the field assert that the increasing
politicization of aid has led to the end of the age of independent humanitarianism.
Woodward (2001: 261) comments, “The NATO bombing operation “Allied Force”
against Yugoslavia in March-June 1999 represents the final disappearance of the
10

narrowing divide between humanitarianism and politics: a war initiated and justified on
humanitarian grounds.” The politicization of humanitarian aid evident in Western
governments’ use of aid as part of their overall geo-political strategies threatens the very
nature of humanitarian aid.
According to Crocker (2001: 242-243), one can assess the success of a
humanitarian intervention on two levels. First, did the intervention save lives? Second,
was the political foundation laid for solving the root problems responsible for the conflict
(Crocker 2001: 242-243)? Implicit in this evaluation is that when one organization or
state acts alone, it is not likely to succeed. However, neutral aid agencies argue that this
is neither their goal nor their responsibility. Crocker cites the United Nations’
peacekeeping presence in Cyprus as an example of an incomprehensive intervention. He
states that their thirty-year effort
has played a useful role of the traditional blue-helmet variety through confidence
building, cease-fire monitoring, and violence reduction. But its success in these terms
has, if anything reduced the pressures among the parties and the Western powers to push
for a real settlement (2001: 243)

It is apparent from this statement and the discussion above, that Crocker advocates the
notion of humanitarian aid that assumes responsibility, not only for the impact of aid, but
also for the implementation of conflict resolution operations.
Some political scientists mentioned above stress the end of the Cold War as
precipitating the collaborative responses to conflict. Hugo Slim (2004: 5) argues that
since humanitarian aid has always existed within highly politicized and highly militarized
environments, nothing has really changed. In fact, he recounts, during the fifty years of
the Cold War, the United States government used the “carrot and stick” approach
11

throughout Central America. Often, the same governments that provided humanitarian
resources were also supporting the militant factions that created the need for aid. Thus,
perhaps it is not the politicization of humanitarian aid that has changed, but the awareness
of this political strategy by the general population. Moreover, only recently was it given
the name “new humanitarianism” and endorsed by some aid agencies (Duffield 2001:
269).
Political scientist Tony Vaux (2004) discusses the principles of neutrality and
impartiality in relation to intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. He divides humanitarian
actors into two main categories. First, there are those who accept that humanitarian aid
can be used to protect Western national interests, but are concerned “that personal
objectives of politicians rather than national interests are driving discussions.” Second,
there are those that assert the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence but
are influenced by governments that fund their operations.
Pamela Aall (2001: 368) justifies the notion of politicized humanitarian aid saying
that humanitarian NGOs can play an essential, but not solitary, role in conflict resolution.
She suggests that humanitarian organizations’ intimate involvement with the conflicting
parties enables them to alert others of a looming battle, act as intermediaries between the
parties, and serve as mediators or facilitators in non-official, or track two, negotiations.
Contrary to the opinions of those cited above who reject the idea of integration,
Aall’s research suggests that humanitarian aid organizations can maintain a neutral
semblance while cultivating an environment in which negotiations between the conflict
parties are able to occur, thus indirectly working towards a political resolution without
12

overtly having a political agenda (2001: 379). Organizations can plant the seeds for
working relationships in the post-conflict period by training locals to function in a civil
society and fostering the development of collaborative relationships across party lines
(379). Additionally, organizations can adjust their programs by distributing identifiable
goods so agencies can recognize them on the market and hold thieves accountable or by
delivering aid directly to the recipients rather than to a third party who may horde the
resources to mitigate negative consequences and enhance the positive effects of their aid
(Aall 2001: 370).
According to Aall, collaboration is particularly important because nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which are organizations that are not a part of any
government and are generally involved in addressing social issues either domestically or
internationally, cannot provide security. However, the dilemma that arises is that a
military presence in a humanitarian operation implies that the aid organization has
political goals. Aall does not seem to see the incompatibility between coordination and
neutrality, stating that an integrated response by states, militaries and NGOs would be the
most effective. When they do not work together, major state powers often perceive the
humanitarian presence in a conflict as a sufficient reason for their inaction, thus the
political aspects of a conflict go unaddressed. Furthermore, these states blame the NGOs
when humanitarian efforts prove insufficient (Aall 2001: 370). Aall suggests that
humanitarian NGOs need to be adaptable to “prevent or counteract the negative effects of
their work.” It is this adaptability that will enable organizations to be successful in the
aid efforts as well as in conflict resolution. Aall seems to be operating from the
13

assumption that aid organizations have an interest in conflict resolution. However, many
neutral organizations assert that such a project would be too political, thus compromising
their neutrality.

The Evolution of International Guidelines for Humanitarian Aid
The international and political environment, through the passing of laws and
resolutions, impacts humanitarian aid organizations. When designing policies to guide
humanitarian aid, organizations are influenced by the guidelines set forth by the
international community. International guidelines have evolved in response to the change
in predominance of international to internal conflict. The question of if and in what
capacity it is appropriate to intervene militarily in a civil conflict is addressed in Article
2(7) of the United Nations charter. This article advises that nothing would “authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state” (Steiner and Alston 2000: 1366). The notion that sovereignty is
sacred and must be protected was widely supported during the Cold War. During this era
humanitarian organizations gained prominence due to their willingness to assist those in
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, the West African Sahel, and Cambodia in a politically neutral
manner despite the international geopolitical divide (Chandler 2001: 680-681).
Following the Cold War, the nature of violent conflicts changed drastically from
international to civil wars generating massive numbers of displaced people and civilian
victims of war. NGOs that had previously operated according to a strict interpretation of
the principle of neutrality began to question whether neutral aid could meet the needs
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generated by this shift. In an effort to clarify the role of the international community via
the UN, the General Assembly passed resolution 46/182 in 1991 to set forth principles to
guide humanitarian assistance in disaster and conflict situations (United Nations 1991).
This resolution seeks to protect both the sovereignty of the affected state and the
members of organizations that enter the conflict zone to deliver aid. According to this
resolution, the affected state has ultimate responsibility to protect and provide for its
people during conflicts. If the state is unable to protect civilians, it must request the aid
of (NGOs). It is through this process of requesting aid that the affected state permits
humanitarian NGOs to access the affected population.
The resolution further delineates operational guidelines for NGOs once they enter
the affected state. These guidelines require that humanitarian assistance is “provided in
accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality” (OCHA 2005).
The principle of humanity refers to the “humanitarian imperative” to provide assistance
wherever it is needed and asserts the “right to receive, and to offer, humanitarian aid”
(Terry 2002: 19). Impartiality refers to the commitment to distribute aid based solely
according to needs, without consideration of the recipient’s political affiliation. As
mentioned previously, neutrality means to refrain from taking part in the conflict or from
acting in a way that furthers the agenda of one party. Based on Lischer’s research
suggesting that aid can unintentionally empower one side over the other, and that such
unintended consequences are more likely when aid is distributed to, or stolen by
individuals who are taking part in the conflict, it seems irresponsible, and potentially not
neutral to provide assistance impartially because aid can support the group that is doing
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harm to another group enabling it to continue abusive practices. Perhaps in contemporary
civil conflicts, these principles become contradictory.
The United Nations proposed its Agenda for Peace in a reaction to the
international community’s ineffective response to the emergence of “new and particularly
deadly” conflicts of the early 1990s (Studer 2002: 371). The Agenda was indicative of
the changing nature of peace-keeping operations. It sought to fuse humanitarian issues
with problems of peace and security. Its purpose was to put the UN’s crippled past
behind it and achieve an organization “capable of maintaining international peace and
security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting. . . social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom" (United Nations 1992). The Organization must
never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed. This, along with other
similar efforts marked the United Nation’s attempt at an integrated approach to peacekeeping which would combine military and humanitarian efforts (Studer 2002: 371).
After the Agenda was signed in 1992, however, against the backdrop of an
international debate over the nature of humanitarian assistance, the horrific human-rights
abuses in Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia further elicited heightened international
expectations for effective, collective action in instances of severe rights violations. The
effect of the international community’s failure to respond effectively in such cases was
starkly evident in the Rwandan genocide.
According to the report, Responsibility to Protect by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the United Nations knew
that government officials in Rwanda were planning genocide. ICISS is a commission
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that supports intervention in sovereign states on humanitarian grounds. It asserts that the
UN Security Council had the resources and the knowledge to prevent, or at least
drastically reduce the genocide that ensued, but refused to act (Evans and Sahnoun 2002:
1).
According to the ICISS report, a “parallel transition from a culture of sovereign
impunity to a culture of national and international accountability” continues to emerge
(Evans and Sahnoun 2002: 13). It is pertinent to be familiar with the changing
perspectives among state actors because states are pushing the coherence agenda, or the
integrative response to conflict. Moreover, “[i]nternational organizations, civil society
activists and NGOs use the international human rights norms and instruments as the
concrete point of reference against which to judge state conduct” (Evans and Sahnoun
2002: 13). Thus, an aid agency may be more inclined to break the principle of neutrality
to speak out against a harsh government, if there was an international norm that
condemned the behavior. Additionally, the degree to which an organization adheres to
the principle of neutrality may be evidenced by how much they challenge states to
intervene in a conflict because a strictly neutral organization would not do so, due to the
political implications involved. Additionally, states are the battlegrounds on which civil
conflicts occur and the boundaries within which humanitarian organizations operate.
Rwanda was one of several instances in which a vague definition of the term
“genocide” and deference to state sovereignty paralyzed the United Nations. The notion
of justifying intervention on humanitarian grounds politicizes humanitarianism.
However, following the intervention in Kosovo, which according to some, ended
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independent humanitarian aid, the UN began to wonder if perhaps the coalition had
authority and sufficient warrant to intervene in a sovereign state without UN approval
(Evans and Sahnoun 2002: 1). Neutral aid organizations do not want to be part of an
humanitarian/political intervention, but state governments are taking it upon themselves
to integrate the two. A dilemma arises concerning whether aid agencies should
collaborate with political entities in the headquarters and try to assert their independence
on the ground, or if they should refrain from collaborating at all. Both options threaten
their ability to maintain neutrality because if organizations remain detached, the actions
of militaries in the name of humanitarianism could be mistakenly linked to aid agencies.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his Millennium Report to the General
Assembly articulated the question inherent in the divergent views between intervention
and state sovereignty:
… if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty,
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica- to gross and systematic
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?
(Evans and Sahnoun 2002: 2)
It is evident from Annan’s statement that states and NGOs, as well as international
organizations, are still attempting to find some middle ground between respect for state
sovereignty and a responsibility to protect individuals from abusive governments. In
2000, the United Nations advanced efforts to implement the Brahimi Report, which “calls
for a more comprehensive approach to peace-keeping, one that takes into account the
humanitarian aspects” of its missions (Studer 2001: 369).
According MSF’s, Nicolas de Torrente (2004), the UN’s concerted efforts to
ensure that the United Nation’s various mechanisms are integrated are steps in its pursuit
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of “comprehensive, durable, and just resolution of conflict” (1). The unfortunate
implication of the coherence approach, is “that meeting lifesaving needs is too limited in
scope, and that the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence that have
typically characterized humanitarian action should be set aside in order to harness aid to
higher goals of peace, security and development” (Torrente 2004: 3). In practice this
means that rather than impartially, aid is distributed conditionally. The states’ political
interests determine who gets assistance, often without regard to need (4).
The literature divides into three main categories: unintended negative
consequences of aid, coordination and collaboration as a means to integrative response to
conflict and a discussion on the United Nations’ and aid agencies’ efforts to deal with
contemporary conflict including instances of genocide and human rights abuses. As
discussed above, all of these topics provide dilemmas to organizations that adhere to the
principle of neutrality. Thus, they provide the basis of my interview questions to be
discussed in the research findings.

III. THE ICRC, MSF AND HUMANITARIAN AID
Before I discuss in detail the manner in which each organization deals with the
above mentioned dilemmas, one must understand the origin, structure and mission of
each organization. Despite the United Nations’ search for a balance between what is
political and what is humanitarian, as discussed in the literature review, aid agencies have
not altered their missions. While Crocker and Aall suggest a model that is interventionist
rather than neutral, victim-biased rather than impartial, and cooperative rather than
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independent, both the ICRC and MSF continue to be guided by the principles of
neutrality, impartiality and independence even when responding to violent civil conflicts.
Despite the moral integrity that intervention on humanitarian grounds seems to possess,
the genuinely compassionate notion of giving all aid resources to the victims of the
conflict, and the seemingly pacific idea of international collaboration on behalf of the
oppressed, aid agencies assert that neutrality, impartiality and independence enable them
to serve the suffering populations to the fullest extent possible. These principles, they
claim, are invaluable when working amidst politicized conflict.

Rationale for studying the ICRC and MSF
I chose to study humanitarian aid organizations’ policies and practices through an
in-depth study of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins
sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders/MSF) because political scientists as well as
some staff members within the organizations refer to these aid agencies as the leaders on
opposite sides of the debate over the nature of neutrality in humanitarian assistance.
Fiona Terry, among others, characterized ICRC as strictly adhering to the principle of
neutrality and prioritizing state sovereignty in its operations; while she portrayed MSF as
taking a more lax stance on neutrality and prioritizing individual human rights through
their practice of medicine without borders. What remains unclear in the literature and the
question that I address in this research is the impact that these differences have on
organizational practice.
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Mission
The ICRC was formed in the19th century to assist wounded soldiers following the
battle of Solferino during the Franco-Austrian War (ICRC 2005). In its early years, the
ICRC cared for injured combatants and victims during World War I. Throughout the past
100 years, the organization has grown tremendously and has worked in nearly every
conflict or disaster situation. ICRC’s mission is to “protect the lives and dignity of
victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance” (ICRC 2005).
MSF is an independent international humanitarian aid organization that serves
over 80 countries. Its primary objective is to rebuild health structures in regions affected
by natural disasters or conflict. In addition, MSF strives “to alleviate human suffering
[and] to protect life and health” (MSF 2005). MSF seeks to “restore and ensure respect
for the human beings and their fundamental human rights” by raising awareness about the
suffering populations with which it works (MSF 2005).

Structure
The organizational structure of the ICRC is “hierarchical with a territorial logic”
(ICRC: I:3:2). For example, there are delegates who work in the field in Darfur and they
report to the head of delegations for Darfur. This individual then reports to the head of
delegation for Sudan, who reports to the head of delegations for Africa, who then reports
to the head of operations. This hierarchical line is referred to as the “red line.” The “blue
line” contains program coordinators for each service (water, construction etc), support
services, administration, and logisticians. In the ICRC the “red line” has authority over
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the “blue line,” and the field has autonomy (ICRC: I:3:2). This essentially means that
those in the field can use their discretion to make choices without first calling the
headquarters to ask permission.
Like ICRC, MSF is a field based organization. There are 18 headquarters in 18
countries. Five of these “sections” actually run operations and 13 support the operational
“sections.” The five MSF locations that run operations are all based in Europe. There is
an international office based in Geneva and its mandate is to coordinate the MSF country
sections on policy making. However, MSF’s operational sections are ultimately
independent from one another. Each operational section has its own operational policies.
Therefore, if MSF-Paris is in charge of operations in Colombia, it will make all of the
decisions on how the operation will run. At the same time, MSF is inter-dependent
because it is seen as only one organization by the outside (MSF: I:1:1-2). Thus, when
one MSF location makes a statement, it reflects on the entire MSF organization.

The Legal Status of the ICRC and MSF
The ICRC is unique among humanitarian aid organizations because, through the
1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols, the international community has
legally mandated the ICRC with specific tasks. The Geneva Conventions, which are a
binding instrument of international law, mandate the ICRC with “visiting prisoners,
organizing relief operations, re-uniting separated families and similar humanitarian
activities during armed conflicts” (ICRC 2005). The ICRC’s statues, which have a
“quasi-legal or soft law status,” encourage the ICRC to take the abovementioned role in
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situations where the Geneva Conventions are not applicable, such as “situations of
internal violence” (ICRC 2005).
The Geneva Conventions mandated the ICRC to promote international
humanitarian law. The ICRC fulfills this mandate by challenging parties to a conflict to
distinguish between combatants and civilians during conflicts, following these guidelines
(ICRC 2005):
•

Attacking solely against military objectives

•

Protecting non-combatants and treating them with humanity

•

Do not attack an adversary who surrenders or can no longer fight

•

Do not use unnecessary force or cause excessive suffering

•

Collect and care for the wounded and sick

•

Respect prisoners of war and protect them from violence

The ICRC is atypical in that it is not an NGO or an intergovernmental
organization (IGO), but is a hybrid of the two. Like an NGO, it is a private and
independent organization, but like an IGO it is mandated by states to serve certain
functions. This unique status is interesting for this research because the ICRC is actually
legally bound and legally protected as a neutral organization.
Following the Cold War, the ICRC was given observer status at the United
Nations General Assembly. Before October 1991, the ICRC had consultative status and
had to rely on states to voice its concerns at meetings. This new status demonstrates the
UN’s desire to cooperate with the ICRC. As an observer the ICRC can attend any
meetings with the General Assembly and speak to the Assembly on its own behalf (Rona
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2004). This is important because as discussed above, the UN has been advocating an
integrative approach to conflict situations while the ICRC wants to maintain its
independence. With the ICRC involved in the UN discussions, perhaps it will be able to
convince the General Assembly that humanitarian aid must be kept separate from military
operations.
MSF is an international NGO. In addition to the three primary principles, it
follows two principles that distinguish it from traditional humanitarianism. They are the
freedom to criticize and the right of intervention, which suggest an activist role for MSF
in the international community. James Orbinski, president of MSF-USA, explained the
first principle when he accepted the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of MSF. He said
that the freedom to criticize, or denunciation, is compatible with the principle of
neutrality, because neutrality, contrary to popular belief, is not synonymous with silence.
Silence has long been confused with neutrality, and has been presented as a necessary
condition of humanitarian action. From its beginning, MSF was created in opposition to
this assumption. We are not sure that words can always save lives, but we know that
silence can certainly kill (Orbinski 1999: www.nobel.no/eng_lect_99m).

The second principle is the subsidiarity of sovereignty or the right of intervention, which
states that organizations have the right to intervene when a state is abusing its citizens,
regardless of the state’s status as sovereign (Chandler 2001: 685). It is the international
community, not the state, which is ultimately responsible for protecting the human rights
of all people. Moreover, the end of human rights violations and the struggle against
oppressive governments is essential to their mission (Chandler 2001: 685). These
organizations may make political statements condemning the abusive regime if doing so
helps them achieve their goals of access and delivering aid to victims of conflict.
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Former director of research and doctor for MSF-Paris, Fiona Terry (2002: 20)
suggests that strict adherence to the principle of neutrality can “[compromise] the
humanitarian imperative to save lives if . . . permission [to deliver aid] is not
forthcoming.” MSF does not advocate delaying assistance in the event that permission is
denied, indicating that MSF places “the needs of victims above concerns of state
sovereignty and neutrality” (Terry 2002: 21). MSF asserts that it should go into a country
to deliver aid even if it is not authorized. Moreover, MSF sees speaking out against
abuses as “part of its responsibility rather than a last resort” (Terry 2002: 21).
Furthermore, Terry asserts that humanitarian actors “need to reclaim their activist role
reminding states that failure to meet their higher responsibility is what allows crises to
unfold in the first place” (Terry 2002: 217).
The nature of warfare following the Cold War presents challenges to MSF’s
neutrality. In situations of total war, when the objective of the war is to kill members of
the other side, and the line between combatants and non-combatants is blurred, some
members of MSF question the relevance of neutrality. Additionally, when denouncing
abusive regimes will lead to the denial of access for MSF, some argue that it should
maintain neutrality and continue its work while others argue that if victims are more
likely to die from violence than from starvation, MSF must speak out.
Obviously ICRC and MSF are two very different organizations. However, they
are both committed to the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. The
ICRC is a very centralized organization with a legal mandate from the Geneva
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Conventions. MSF is decentralized and appears to have more freedom in its operations
due to its independence from a legally binding mandate.

IV. CASE STUDY: THE DARFUR CONFLICT
It is important to study organizational practices in a conflict setting to illustrate
how ideology is made manifest in field work. Thus, when relevant and available, I offer
specific examples from the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan. Darfur is an
appropriate context for this research because its status as a contemporary, humanitarian
crisis, resulting from a violent civil conflict presents various dilemmas pertaining to
politicization and neutrality.
The conflict in Darfur began in February, 2003. The Northern Arab Muslims and
the Southern black African Christians were in the midst of signing a resolution to end the
long term Sudanese civil war. The Black Muslims in the North-West region of Darfur
felt ostracized and cheated during the North/South negotiations. In response, the Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), made up
primarily of Black African tribes, attacked government targets demanding recognition, a
“share in Sudan’s wealth and better services for the region” (Kahn 2004: 1961). The
government-supported Arab militia (Janjaweed) reacted harshly to the uprising. The
Janjaweed killed thousands of civilians and burned villages populated by African tribes,
forcing thousands to flee their homes (Marshall 2005: 553).
As mentioned previously, the crises of the 1990s influenced perceptions of the
debate concerning politicization versus neutrality or responsibility versus sovereignty.
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Thus it is important to study the humanitarian organizations in a contemporary situation
to more fully understand the practical implications of organizational ideology and make
policy recommendations for the future. Additionally, since the conflict is current, the
respondents will be able to provide explicit descriptions of how policy impacts practice,
thus deepening the validity of their responses.
It is important to study the organizations in a dire humanitarian crisis because it is
under extreme situations that the organization’s commitment to its guiding principles is
tested. Although Darfur has been described as a humanitarian crisis, there is not a
mechanism to move the international community beyond recognition, to intervention
(Straus 2005: 123). There is, however, such a mechanism if a situation is declared a
genocide. Darfur is a valuable context for this research because of the debate over
whether or not the violence qualifies as genocide. The UN Convention on Prevention
and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide, which was established in 1948, in reaction to
the Holocaust requires signatory states to use military intervention to stop situations of
declared genocide (Singh 2004: 230).
The issue of genocide affects humanitarian aid organizations in conflict situations
because organizations may respond according to their understanding of neutrality. For
example, a more politically inclined organization may attempt to influence states to
declare genocide and shame the states if they do not respond. Conversely, a strictly
neutral organization may remain absent from the genocide debate or conclude that
moving the international community toward a declaration of genocide is neither its goal
nor its responsibility. An understanding of how states respond to such humanitarian
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crises is essential to this research because state actors ultimately have the capacity to act
politically via policy changes or a military intervention. The level of cooperation
between states and aid agencies depends on the organization’s understanding of neutrality
and how it impacts its practices.
In July 2004, US Congress passed a resolution labeling the events in Darfur,
Sudan that had (up to that point) led to the killing of “more than 70,000 civilians and
uprooted an estimated 1.8 million more since February, 2003 as genocide.” Contrary to
the Genocide Convention’s intentions and the international community’s expectations,
this label did not push signatory states to intervene in Sudan. In July, 2004 before
President Bush or Colin Powell ever spoke the word “genocide” the UN Security Council
had passed a resolution condemning Sudan and giving the government a month to stop
the militias. However, “that deadline passed without incident” (Straus 2005:123). The
genocide debate involves issues of political sovereignty, individual rights, and
international response. Genocide is a situation in which some sectors of the international
community, through the establishment of the Genocide Convention and the ICISS report,
has already agreed that political and humanitarian responses should be integrated. Thus,
a study of humanitarian organizations operating in the context of this debate will further
enhance the value of this study.
Finally, it is important to study the organizations within the context of a violent
conflict rather than in a natural disaster. In civil conflict the political implications of aid
are most profound and the principle of neutrality is most applicable and most stringently
tested. The principle of neutrality is especially important in civil conflicts because the
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state government is involved and some part of the population is suffering. Can an
organization respect the sovereignty of a state that is killing its citizens? Does the
organization still need to abide by the government’s rules and respect its authority to
deny aid organizations access to the suffering population? These questions add to the
relevance of the Darfur conflict and allow me to apply the research findings to other civil
conflicts.

V. METHODS

Data Collection
The literature reviewed above raises several issues that I address in this research.
The research builds on Lischer’s research on unintended consequences by examining
how ICRC and MSF deal with the potential for negative impacts of aid. Additionally, I
expand on the integration literature by explaining the ways in which humanitarian
organizations’ interpretation of the principle of neutrality impacts their practices of
collaboration with other organizations or civil militaries. Civil military is a term used to
indicate a military that does work which is generally left to civilians. For example a
military that runs a humanitarian aid operation is a civil military. Finally, I incorporate
current events concerning Darfur, including the genocide debate and concern over human
rights, in an effort to highlight the impact of neutrality on the organization’s practices of
speaking publicly about violations of International Humanitarian Law or human rights.
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Sample
I selected a purposive sample from each organization to ensure that the
interviewee was able to offer insight into the areas of concern and to ensure that I had a
range of perspectives within each organization. I began by contacting the United States
headquarters for each organization. I asked for the name of an individual who could
speak about the policy of neutrality and the organization’s practices in Darfur. When
speaking with the first interviewee, I requested the names of individuals who were, or had
recently, been working in the Darfur region of Sudan. I continued to use the snowball
sampling technique until I identified four qualified, knowledgeable staff members in
ICRC and three in MSF. I interviewed staff from the administrative level as well as field
workers. The purpose of interviewing administrative and field staff was to account for
differences that may be dependent on one’s position in the organization. My sample size
was seven interviewees.
All of the interviewees from ICRC have worked in the field in many countries at
various times in their careers. Their current positions are as follows:
1) The Spokesperson for ICRC in the United States and Canada
2) The Head of Delegation for the Continent of Africa
3) The Head of Delegation for the country of Sudan
4) The Head of Delegation for the field in Darfur

The interviewees from MSF also had a wide range of international experience.
They occupy the following positions:
1) Program officer at MSF, New York with MSF-USA
2) Former director general in Darfur, current executive director of Darfur for
MSF-Sweden.
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3) Head of missions in Darfur (2004), currently a researcher at the MSF
Foundation
In addition to conducting in-depth interviews with the above-mentioned
individuals, I analyzed organizational reports and articles written by staff members
concerning neutrality and organizational practices. The articles analyzed for this research
are the following:
ICRC
1) International Humanitarian Law: Answers to Your Questions.
2) Annual Report on Operations in Sudan
3) The ICRC and Civil-Military Relations in Armed Conflict (Meinrad Studer)
4) Crisis in Darfur: ICRC Action in Facts and Figures
MSF
1) The Principle of Neutrality: Is it Relevant to MSF? (Fiona Terry)
2) Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration’s False Promise (Nicolas de Torrente)
3) Security Council Veto Power Hindering Protection of Civilians: Humanitarian
Aid Must Not be Subordinate to Political Objectives
4) Annual Report on Operations in Sudan
5) The Crushing Burden of Rape: Sexual Violence in Darfur

Procedures for Obtaining Informed Consent
I e-mailed a copy of the research description and the consent form to the
interviewees prior to the interview. Since the interviews were conducted by phone and
five were international, I asked each interviewee if they had reviewed the form and if
they permitted me to tape record our conversation immediately after turning on the tape
recorder. This tape-recorded oral agreement provided me with the permission to conduct,
record, transcribe and use the interviews for research purposes.
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Confidentiality
Once the interviews were completed, I transcribed them and used the
transcriptions as my data. All tapes, notes, and transcriptions remained under my control
at all times and were stored in a locked file cabinet in my home. In all work derived from
the research (e.g., graduate thesis, oral presentations, and discussions with my advisors), I
maintained the anonymity of the interviewees. (See Appendix B for a copy of the consent
form).

Data Analysis
The research process was inductive in nature. I conducted a qualitative study
using in-depth interviews with the organizations’ administrative and field staff. I then
coded the responses according to six categories: neutrality, coordination and
collaboration, unintended consequences of aid, genocide, human rights and political
influences. The interview questions allowed me to draw conclusions about how the
organizational ideology affects practice in Darfur in each of the above mentioned
categories.
Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Aid. The literature offered examples
of how aid can inadvertently exacerbate the conflict including theft, feeding militants and
supporting the war economy. This category addresses questions concerning the
organization’s response to potentially harmful consequences. For example, do they
monitor the effects of aid? Do they adjust or learn from their experiences on the ground?
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Do they have policies that guide the individuals in the field on how to prevent or deal
with misuse of aid?
Coordination and Collaboration. The literature suggested that coordinated
humanitarian responses are more effective than solitary efforts. This category addressed
the issues involved in coordinating humanitarian aid efforts with other aid agencies, local
authorities, the UN, states and civil militaries. Specifically, respondents addressed how
the organization deals with ideological differences among aid agencies when working
side by side on the ground. Additionally, respondents commented on how the
organization’s interpretation of neutrality impacts its level coordination with the above
mentioned entities.
Genocide. I used the term genocide as it was broadly defined by the Genocide
Convention as “any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group, as such: a) killing members of the
group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e)
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (Steiner and Alston 2000:
122). This category addressed questions regarding how neutrality impacts the
organization’s involvement in the genocide debate in Darfur and its practices concerning
the issue of genocide in general.
Human Rights. I used the term human rights in this research to mean equal
protection which is the only substantive human right mentioned in the UN Charter
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(Steiner and Alston 2000: 1371). This includes such non-derogable civil and political
rights as the right to life, freedom from torture and slavery, “the right to recognition
everywhere as a person before the law”, “the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion” (Steiner and Alston 2000: 1383-1386). For the purpose of this research I did
not include economic, social or cultural rights when using this term.
Political Influences. This section addresses the issue of donor states influencing
aid agencies to act according to the states’ political interests. Additionally, it deals with
the topic of aid organizations as mediators in conflict resolution attempts. Specifically,
do aid agencies take a role in influencing the political landscape in a covert manner as
Aall (2001) suggests?
Genocide, human rights and political influences are immensely important to this
research because aid agencies enter states that have tenuous political systems. Violations
of international humanitarian aid and human rights are occurring, whether through
genocide or less harsh means, and aid will likely impact these situations, either positively
or negatively. The organization must decide if its role will be to deliver aid strictly
according to its mandate, regardless of its impact; or if it will assess its impact and push
local and international state governments to make policy changes that will positively
impact those suffering in the conflict zone. Aid agencies may not be able to prevent
genocide or human rights abuses, nor can they end the political tyranny of a state
government, but they can take responsibility if their aid’s impact is unintentionally
enabling or exacerbating such abuses.
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I coded the organizations’ reports and articles according to the same six categories
mentioned above. I then searched for emerging themes that answered my research
question. I stated my research findings about the differences or similarities between the
two organizations for each category. I then extrapolated these findings and drew general
conclusions about the impact of organizational ideological understandings of the
principle of neutrality on humanitarian aid practices in conflict situations. Finally, I
offered original policy recommendations for aid agencies, the United Nations and the
states.

VI. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Neutrality
According to both the ICRC and MSF neutrality means that the organization does
not take sides in the conflict (ICRC: I:1:2) (ICRC:I:2:4) (ICRC:I:4:2) (MSF:I:1:1) (MSF:
I:2:1) (MSF: I:3:1). Moreover, neutrality means that the organization must refrain from
“engaging in controversies of a political or ideological nature” or from questioning the
motivation of the conflicting parties (ICRC: I:3:11). Finally, to be neutral implies that
the organization must have permission from the authorities before distributing aid in a
sovereign state (Terry 2002: 20). This section will address the organizations’
understanding of neutrality as it applies to the organizational goals. Additionally, it
discusses the principles of impartiality and independence and how these principles relate
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to neutrality. Finally, it addresses the internal conflict that arises within organizations
concerning the applicability of neutrality to the organizations’ practice.
The definition of neutrality does not differ from one organization to another. The
manner in which the definition impacts practice varies in the organization’s willingness
to speak publicly to condemn the practices of an abusive party. In practice, the principle
of neutrality is one aspect of the triad of neutrality, impartiality and independence
(ICRC:I:1:2) (ICRC: I:2:9) (MSF:I:2:2) (MSF:I:1:2). One ICRC respondent explained
that the principles of impartiality and independence are operative, meaning they explicitly
direct the practices of the organization. Impartiality implies that the organization
provides assistance on the basis of need, regardless of political affiliation. The third
principle refers to the organization’s independence from both the states that fund their
operations and the states in which they work (ICRC:I:1:2-3), (MSF:I:2:2), (MSF:I:1:2).
These principles are interdependent because an organization that distributes aid
impartially and is independent of political entities is more able to maintain neutrality.
ICRC’s fundamental goal is to maintain access to vulnerable populations.
Respondents assert that neutrality is central both to the ICRC’s identity and the manner in
which it works (ICRC: I:1:3). Delivering adequate assistance depends on the
organization’s ability to access the individuals in need, evaluate the situation and
determine the appropriate response (ICRC: I:2:4), (ICRC 2005). If the organization
values access, it must “guarantee to every party to the conflict that [it is] not [seeking
access to further] its own agenda . . . but rather, its only concern is [to assist and protect]
the people in need” (ICRC:I:2:4). ICRC’s respondents and written reports consistently
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referred to the principle of neutrality as pragmatic, or as enabling their primary goal of
access to the victims of conflict because the authorities or the rebel groups are more
inclined to allow a neutral organization access to these populations, rather than one that is
overtly political (ICRC:I:1:2), (ICRC:I:2:4).
Although the principle of neutrality has existed since the 19th century and is
adopted by all humanitarian aid agencies, internal conflict regarding the relevance of
neutrality is prevalent among organizations that work in politicized conflict zones. Thus,
even though neutrality is a deep-rooted guiding principle, organizations continue to
struggle with its applicability to contemporary conflicts in which the objective is often to
kill the opponent, and violations of international humanitarian law are rampant. These
individuals advocate the removal of neutrality from the Charter completely, while others
would like to see MSF “adhering to a spirit of neutrality,” following some of the aspects
of neutrality but adopting a more fluid definition of the principle (Terry 2000: 1). These
disagreements were evident in the inconsistent responses that I gathered from MSF
interviewees and written reports.
Some staff members of MSF adopt ICRC’s perspective, stating that “MSF should
remain neutral because it would be difficult to deliver aid in conflict situations without
following this principle” (MSF:I:2:2). This is the most common argument for
maintaining adherence to the principle of neutrality. It is based on the notion that
neutrality is a “useful operational tool to facilitate access to populations and to avoid
giving belligerents a pretext for blocking aid or attacking aid organizations.” However,
Terry argues that if MSF accepts neutrality as an operational principle, it must also accept
37

that it will have to adjust practices to maintain neutrality. She explains, “neutrality does
not only need to be asserted, it needs to be proved by aid organizations, and believed by
parties to the conflict” (6). Thus it needs to be applied to field practices or it is
ineffectual in attaining the organization’s goals (Terry, 2000:6).
Contrarily, according to one MSF interviewee neutrality is not operational, but
rather is a “very general principle that really has no significance when viewed alone”
without impartiality and independence (MSF:I:1:2). It must, according to such
perspectives, be understood as a general way of being, rather than informing specific
practices. This respondent seems to suggest that neutrality can be a theoretical
perspective without directly impacting practice. For example, an organization can refrain
from taking sides in theory, but does not necessarily adjust practices to assure that the
conflicting parties also perceive it as not taking sides.
Terry insists on the essentiality of consistency between an organization’s policy
and its practice primarily because the perception of an organization is immensely
important in conflict situations. For example, the ICRC rarely makes public
denunciations because it adheres strictly to the principle of neutrality. This absence from
the public domain ensures that the ICRC maintains the perception of neutrality at all
times. Moreover, it protects the ICRC from the “risk of manipulation and the risk of
misperception” of such denunciations (ICRC:I:2:4). This perception then enables the
ICRC to establish trusting relationships with the parties to the conflict (ICRC:I:2:4).
From Terry’s perspective, it follows that if MSF is going to denounce governments for
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abusive practices then its perception of neutrality will be tarnished and is therefore not
relevant to its mission.
To further elucidate MSF’s difficulty in applying neutrality to conflict situations,
Terry reminds us that MSF was created by former ICRC doctors who were frustrated by
the limitations that neutrality imposed on their ability to deliver aid to areas restricted by
the Nigerian government during the Biafran famine. Terry asserts that there is a
contradiction within the organization when it claims to follow the principle of neutrality
while simultaneously vowing to practice medicine without borders. This notion of being
without borders “puts the needs of people . . . above the respect for the rules of states.”
Conversely, the principle of neutrality assumes deference to state authority (Terry 2000:
1). Thus, there are those within MSF who point to the origin of MSF as supportive of a
more outspoken role in conflict situations. Likewise, there are those who assert that the
story is an oversimplified version of how MSF has come to exist. One interviewee stated
that:
above all, you will soon find that MSF and ICRC hold today very similar
positions regarding neutrality and independence, for reasons that have to do with
the evolutions of the international political and legal environments in which both
organizations intervene as well as their own internal evolutions (MSF:I:3:1).
This interviewee stressed the importance of the change in the nature of conflict
since the impetus of MSF. Specifically, he noted that the war on terrorism has made
MSF more conscious of its perception of neutrality because when there is an outside
occupying force in the region, outside humanitarian aid agencies run the risk of being
associated with the military agenda. In Darfur, the Sudanese militias are supported by the
Sudanese government. And to those in Darfur, the actions of the militias resemble those
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of an occupying force. Thus, the “political significance of where you stand and who you
help is very similar… to a situation of occupation” (MSF:I:3:3). Clearly there are two
distinct views of neutrality within MSF: those who align themselves with ICRC and
argue that neutrality is essential to its mission; and those who stress a new humanitarian
or advocacy role for the agency to fulfill the aspect of the mission that calls for freedom
to denunciate abusive practices. Finally, there are those who assert that it is not
contradictory for the agency to maintain neutrality while also publicly denouncing
abusive practices.

Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Aid
In the above-mentioned discussion, the importance of perception emerges. When
an aid agency is concerned about whether outside entities perceive it as neutral, it is
essential that it closely monitor the impact of its assistance programs. The literature
discussed in the review suggests that despite humanitarian organizations’ adherence to
the principle of neutrality, aid can have political consequences. Lisher (2003) asserts that
if misuse of aid is widespread it can actually do more harm than good. In this section, I
will discuss how neutrality relates to the manner in which aid organizations respond to
the potential for unintended consequences of assistance.
Both MSF and ICRC are aware that aid can be detrimental if military groups use
it to further their own agendas. This awareness motivates each organization to be vigilant
regarding the impact of their work in situations of immense violence and political unrest
(MSF 3:6-8). In Darfur, and other contemporary civil conflicts, it is difficult to ensure
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that resources are not misused because many civilians who seek assistance during the day
are combatants by night (ICRC:I:3:6). An MSF interviewee explained, “Claiming that. . .
[MSF’s] help has never been misused would be hypocritical and completely illusory”
(MSF:I:3:6-8). He recognizes that the risk always exists and aid is always misused in
part because the organizations work in very politicized situations where they are often
“not dealing with governments and official armies but with rebel groups and civilian
warriors” which makes it difficult to track aid (MSF:I:3:6-8).
Both the ICRC and MSF have operational guidelines which the organizations
assert help to reduce the potential for negative effects. In reducing the unintended
consequences, the organizations are actively attempting to maintain their neutrality.
These operational tools include delivering aid directly to the beneficiaries, monitoring for
aid’s impact, delivering only that which is necessary when it is necessary, and providing
assistance that helps the recipients to become more autonomous. ICRC respondents
rationalize the effectiveness of the first guideline saying that the organization
independently delivers aid resources rather than depending on local authorities or NGOs
to lead the distribution because when aid is delivered “directly to the hands of every
single family” it reduces the likelihood that it will be diverted from the victims or sold
somewhere else (ICRC:I:2:7-8), (ICRC:I:1:5).
The second guideline, to monitor the impact of aid, is essential to humanitarian
assistance. The organizations must be able to access the people, “to assess an area. . . to
evaluate and to monitor the assistance they provide” (MSF:I:1:4). ICRC interviewees
agreed that assessment is a very important tool. Initially the organization assesses the
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needs of the community to determine the appropriate response (ICRC:I:3:3-4). After aid
is distributed, organizations return to the location to follow up, talk to the recipients and
ensure that they reaped the benefits of the resources (ICRC:I:1:6), (MSF:I:1:4). Being on
the ground, close to the people “allows you to get very direct, very focused information
about the needs, and [ICRC tries] to react accordingly” (ICRC:I:1:6).
An ICRC respondent explained that the organization works solely in emergency
situations. Once the initial needs are met and the situation is no longer an emergency, the
ICRC stops delivering aid. Moreover, it is easier for individuals to sell aid resources on
the market when there is more than what is needed. Thus, by working only in
emergency situations and delivering only that which is necessary during these times,
ICRC attempts to reduce the potential for aid to become part of the war economy
(ICRC:I:1:5).
The fourth practical guideline is to provide aid that can help families to gain
independence (ICRC:I:2:7-8). For example, ICRC gave recipients two bags of grain and
two bags of wheat- one for consumption and one for cultivation. This guideline, along
with delivering the “least possible amount of external aid” encourages some level of
independence (ICRC:I:3:3-4). An interviewee explained that there is no way to ensure
that the family is not robbed of aid on their way home, but so far in Darfur the ICRC has
not seen this on a massive scale (ICRC:I:2:7-8).
If, despite following these operational guidelines, aid is being misused, an ICRC
respondent explained that it “would not retire the aid, [it] would refocus the resources”
(ICRC:I:3:3-4). However, if the situation cannot be remedied by adjusting the relief
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program or if the organization is not able to access the populations to assess the situation,
both organizations would regretfully pull out of the situation (MSF:I:1:4). For example,
in Darfur the ICRC “did decide not to deliver assistance when the beneficiaries were
asking” the organization not to give them aid because it was making them targets to
looting by militia groups (ICRC:I:3:6). Then, five months later, the ICRC decided to try
to restart assistance to the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. It did so only after
having a meeting with the government and the armed militias to tell them that ICRC
would continue to distribute aid in Darfur “only if [they] swore on the Koran that these
camps will not be attacked and will be respected as neutral areas” (ICRC:I:3:6).
Fortunately, the respondent continued, “it worked” (ICRC:I:3:6).
The literature suggested that the best way for aid organizations to counteract
unintended consequences is to work collaboratively with militaries and state
governments. However, both organizations follow the principles of neutrality and
independence which makes coordinating activities with a political entity problematic.

Coordination and Collaboration
Both the principles of independence and neutrality impact practice by influencing
the manner in which the organization collaborates with other humanitarian organizations
or coordinates with militaries. Essentially, I found that both organizations are dedicated
to helping victims in conflict situations and if coordinating efforts enables them to better
serve the victims without compromising the basic principles of neutrality, independence
and impartiality, they will do so.
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National Red Cross Societies. The National Red Cross or Red Crescent society is
the ICRC’s consistent partner in every country. The ICRC prefers to work with the
national societies rather than going to a local NGO or the government because it values
its independence (ICRC:I:1:3). The Red Cross and Red Crescent societies exist in nearly
every country in the world and are components of the same movement from which the
ICRC comes. Each society works in its home country according to the principles of
international humanitarian law and the statutes of the International Movement. Each
entity is independent, but the ICRC will provide “funds, training, materials, relief
supplies and technical support” to assist the National Red Cross and Red Crescent’s
efforts in responding to emergencies (ICRC 2005). Although some ICRC interviewees
insisted that the organization does not work with other entities, one operations report
states that along with its partners in the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
the “ICRC coordinated [its] activities closely with UN agencies [and] non-governmental
organizations. . . to further develop its programs to protect and assist victims” (ICRC
2005).
NGOs and IGOs. I found that the ICRC and MSF work in an unofficial capacity
with NGOs in the field. The ICRC explained that it must work on an unofficial basis
only because it does not want to be perceived as sharing the opinions of other
organizations. For example, if an organization starts to have armed escorts from the
African Union then the ICRC is not able to work with it in the field. Likewise, if an
organization decides to speak publicly, then it is difficult for the ICRC to work with it.
Being associated with such political sentiments would certainly damage the ICRC’s
44

ability to maintain access to the victims (ICRC:I:2-4). One ICRC respondent explained
the organization’s attitude towards coordination saying that its
culture of independence, sometimes seen as isolationist, further [fosters] the
perception of neutrality. By relying exclusively on its own means to ensure the
logistics and security of its operations and the assessment of the humanitarian
situation, the ICRC is seen as a predictable and reliable partner (ICRC: I:3).
An MSF respondent gave an example of this notion of unofficial collaboration,
stating that, “in Darfur we collaborate to provide material support when working on the
ground” (MSF:I:2:2). MSF also works in an unofficial capacity with other organizations
such as those that run the HIV-AIDS program in Africa. But, he continued, MSF does
“not document that [it works] with other NGOs- it is unofficial” (MSF:I:2:2). Like
ICRC, MSF’s collaborative efforts remain unofficial because “it is difficult to coordinate
with others when you are working in a crisis situation” (MSF:I:2:2). Moreover, the
organizations may have a “conflict of opinion” and would not want to be associated with
the other (MSF:I:2:2).
The ICRC and MSF frequently work together in the field. One MSF respondent
explained that although the organizations may have “differences of interpretation or
differences of analysis,” sometimes the things that differentiate the organizations actually
make them complimentary in some conflict situations (MSF:I:3:6). For example, when
the organizations were working in Rwanda, MSF had a difficult time asserting its
neutrality because it was a French organization attempting to work in a region where the
French government had been a colonial power and in a state where the French had
collaborated with the Hutus, who were in political power at that time. According to this
interviewee, the “ICRC is more easily perceived as a neutral organization” (MSF:I:3:6).
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So while in Rwanda, MSF decided that in order to continue a humanitarian presence, it
would “work under the umbrella of ICRC” (MSF:I:3:6). MSF’s collaborative
relationship with ICRC enabled it to continue working in Rwanda. However, when MSF
realized that the situation in which it was working was a genocide, it stepped out from
under the ICRC umbrella in order to speak publicly about the violations that were taking
place. MSF decided that it could not “continue to work in a genocide situation because
[one] cannot cure someone and. . . then give him back to. . . be executed” (MSF:I:3:6).
This relationship worked for both ICRC and MSF. MSF was able to continue
working as long as it deemed its efforts beneficial. And when MSF decided to speak out,
ICRC supported its decision to do so saying, “Go ahead, we cannot do it, but you should”
(MSF:I:3:6). Thus, in a situation where MSF’s origin created suspicion about its
intentions and ICRC’s legal mandate prohibited it from speaking out, they had a
complimentary working relationship (MSF:I:3:6). It seems logical to suggest at this point
that perhaps MSF and ICRC could maintain a working relationship in the future that
would allow both organizations to assist populations in need by maintaining access, and
would also give MSF the freedom to denounce abuses if they become apparent. If such a
relationship were established, however, ICRC would likely be associated with MSF’s
public denunciations and would lose credibility as a neutral organization. Genocide is a
very relevant issue in humanitarian aid and will be discussed in more detail in a later
section.
United Nations. It is difficult for neutral aid agencies to assess the degree to
which they will cooperate with the United Nations because although it has humanitarian
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aid organizations within it, it is clearly a political organization. Both organizations assert
that they maintain distance from organizations with political agendas in order to protect
the perception of their own neutrality. However, the ICRC and MSF will collaborate
with the humanitarian organizations that are part of the United Nations because they
interact with organizations such as The World Food Program (WFP) in the field every
day. Thus the organizations exchange information about the nature of the needs in areas
where one organization may not have access. The information is always limited “to
exclusively humanitarian topics” because violating the confidentiality of parties to the
conflict regarding other issues would threaten ICRC’s neutrality (ICRC:I:2:4-5). The
ICRC will always deal directly with the authorities regarding violations of international
humanitarian law.
The ICRC does not coordinate with the political or security branch of the United
Nations. According to one respondent, these UN branches have over-reacted about the
situation in Darfur and the ICRC does not want to be linked to the UN’s actions or
statements. For example, there was concern over the security of a main road in Darfur
because several NGOs were being stopped and looted. So the security branch of the UN
“decided to first stop the movement on the road,” which seemed like an appropriate
response. But then the UN requested that the African Union use its helicopters to
evacuate the people that were based in the town south of El Geneina. According to the
ICRC, this was over-reacting and sending a message that security was worse than it
actually was (ICRC:I:4:2-3). Subsequently, the respondent continued, the political wing
of the UN (via Mr. Egland), made a statement concerning security for West Darfur. He
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said that “humanitarians were in danger and they were directly targeted by the
Janjaweed” (ICRC:I:4:2-3). According to this interviewee, the statement was written for
politicians in the Security Council to give them an incentive to come up with a strong
resolution. It is important for aid organizations like the ICRC and MSF to stay away
from politically motivated actors because, as this example illustrates, they can amplify a
situation and put the aid workers in danger if they are somehow seen as connected to the
UN (ICRC:I:4:2-3).
Local Authorities. Both MSF and ICRC emphasize the importance of
coordinating with local authorities. One MSF interviewee explained that as soon as the
organization arrives in the field, it locates and discusses the aid program with the local
authority, whether it is a “government, military group, rebel group, local authority or
local chief” (MSF:I:1:3). Ultimately the authorities are in charge of the well-being of the
local populations, and since MSF’s work is “a work for the people, together with the
people,” and the authorities can decide if MSF stays or goes, it is important to maintain
open communications with them (MSF:I:1:3).
One ICRC interviewee made a very interesting point about the lack of aid
agencies’ collaboration with the local people on a policy level. He said that he has
attended several meetings in Khartoum. Each time he encounters a “table of 50 peopleamong whom 38 are Caucasians, no Sudanese, and all of them [are] talking about Sudan
and how to administer it” (ICRC:I:3:10-11). They theorize about “how to solve the
problem. . . and most of the time they forget to invite the Sudanese themselves”
(ICRC:I:3:10-11). Perhaps the organizations conduct meetings without local
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involvement because they want to remain separate from local politics. But this
interviewee suggests that such meetings are often full of “white Western Christians
seeking the high moral ground denouncing third world governments about anything and
everything” (ICRC:I:3:10). The respondent’s point in telling this anecdote is that we
have to be careful “when we criticize governments not to fall in this trap of a sort of
moral new colonialism” (ICRC:I:3:10). Neutrality, according to this respondent, means
to refrain from questioning why the parties involved choose to engage in conflict.
This story depicts another dilemma that is emerging in this research. Both
organizations explained that they strive to empower recipients of aid to be independent
by providing them with assistance that enables them to self-sustain. However, one of the
most important means of sustaining one’s community is to solve problems that arise
during conflict. If aid agencies engaged local people in their planning meetings, they
could train local leaders to analyze the needs and devise a plan to meet these needs.
Moreover, if local people are not involved in such planning, then perhaps the aid agencies
will not implement the most needed program or do so in the most effective manner.
Although the organizations assess the needs before bringing aid, involving local
populations in assessing the needs themselves would be beneficial to both groups. Local
leaders would learn the skills of assessing needs and strategizing a plan to fulfill them.
Aid agencies would benefit because they would know how to implement a program in the
most beneficial way to the community and they would be able to move to a different
location sooner because local leaders could take over.
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MSF also stresses the importance of communication with local authorities
“especially in a situation of occupation because the general political order [and] security
rests with the occupying force” (MSF:I:3:4). Thus it is necessary to communicate with
the authorities in order to assist the population (MSF:I:3:4). In these situations, an MSF
respondent explained, the organization’s neutrality “could be understood as talking to all
sides” in an effort to gain access to the victims (MSF:I:3:4).
Civil militaries. Perhaps the most difficult dilemma regarding coordination and
collaboration is the relationship between humanitarian aid and civil militaries. As the
role of the international community adapts to the post-Cold War era, civil militaries are
becoming increasingly acceptable. Militaries embark on peace-support operations and
the Security Council is more apt to sanction military intervention on humanitarian
grounds. Since the aid organizations are neutral and independent, the infiltration of an
overtly political entity in its formerly purely humanitarian domain presents serious
dilemmas to its practice in conflict situations.
Because both organizations are neutral, neither ever recommends that a state
military intervene for humanitarian reasons. This, the ICRC asserts, is a political issue
and its involvement in matters of a political nature would harm its ability to do
humanitarian work (ICRC 2005). An MSF respondent admitted that at times it is
“tempting to call for armed intervention in a conflict;” but there are many problems that
would arise. First, the respondent continued “if you want to be neutral in a conflict you
cannot call a military to fight a war against one party.” Second, MSF “can never measure
the consequence of an armed intervention.” MSF recognizes that armed intervention may
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not be the solution to the conflict and it cannot be accountable for any negative effects
that calling for military intervention may elicit (MSF:I:1:3).
Another dilemma emerges in that both organizations work to save individual
lives. Thus, if a government is supporting a militia that is killing the very individuals the
agencies are working to save, it would be in line with the humanitarian imperative to save
lives if the agencies worked to end the killing. The research findings suggest that there is
a fine line between preventing an individual from being harmed and assisting an
individual after they have been harmed. The former requires political action while the
latter can be accomplished while maintaining neutrality. Neither organization advocates
involving militaries in a humanitarian effort.
The ICRC has responded to the dilemmas of coordination with civil militaries by
maintaining dialogues with the civil militaries and peacekeeping forces in the field but
refraining from coordinating operations. Additionally, the ICRC communicates with
political and military policy makers “to promote the ICRC’s view of humanitarian action
and, where necessary, to foster and maintain contacts useful for operational cooperation
and for enhancing respect for international humanitarian law” (Studer 2001: 388). When
assessing the stance of the ICRC on the issue of coordination it is important to remember
its goal of maintaining access to victims and promoting international humanitarian law.
Thus, its refusal to coordinate with militaries or to call for military intervention is a
logical means to ensure its ability to meet these goals.
Only when coordinating with civil militaries does not threaten its neutrality and
when it facilitates its goal of maintaining access and protecting international
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humanitarian law, will the ICRC do so. For example, the ICRC will use armed guards to
protect its equipment and facilities when it is necessary. “However, the impact of such
arrangements on the perception of the ICRC’s neutrality and impartiality is regularly
assessed” (Studer 2001: 389). The ICRC only uses military or civil defense resources
when “they are offered on conditions that provide a clear advantage or because
comparable civilian assets are not available” and doing so does not threaten its perception
of being neutral and impartial.
The ICRC takes part in some military training programs with the intention of
making sure its mandate is understood. Additionally, it “establishes and maintains
organization-to-organization relations with military academies and other facilities that
train military and civilian personnel” in order to be “directly involved in the training” on
the subjects of international humanitarian law and the “basic principles governing
humanitarian action. The ICRC also takes an active part “in multilateral and other
conferences dealing with the relationship between military and humanitarian action to
promote its view of crisis management and to share its operational experience” (Studer
2001: 390).
The notion of a collaborative relationship with civil militaries is one area in which
there seems to be considerable disagreement within MSF. Some of the literature refers to
MSF as the leader in the new humanitarian agenda, which is more willing to cooperate
with military forces and suspend its neutrality when human rights violations are rampant
(Benthal 1993: 125). However, Nicolas de Torrente (2004:12), Executive Director of
MSF-USA, wrote an article that strongly criticizes such an approach as “politicized” and
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detrimental to the humanitarian imperative to save individual lives. In this article, he
explains that an approach that integrates humanitarian aid and civil military intervention
is inherently flawed. Such integrative responses lead to conditional rather than impartial
distribution of aid. Additionally, he writes:
the fundamental principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality not only
characterize humanitarian action’s single minded purpose of alleviating suffering,
unconditionally and without any ulterior motive- they also serve as operational
tools that help in obtaining the consent of belligerents and trust of communities
for the presence and activities of humanitarian organizations, particularly in
highly volatile contexts (Torrente, 2004: 6).
Torrente’s concern is that aid would be used as a reward for, or a bribe to align
with, a certain political ideology if militaries are responsible for its distribution. When
aid organizations are seen as associates of governments that “make all assistance
including humanitarian aid, an integral part of their overall politico-military enterprise,”
it can lead authorities to deny humanitarian organizations access to suffering populations
(Torrente, 2004:6). Furthermore, it makes aid workers “prominent targets for violent
opposition” by those for whom killing aid workers furthers their “goal of destabilizing
and undermining the international community’s political project” (Torrente 6). From
Torrente’s perspective, coordinated efforts will clearly lead to biased rather than impartial
and neutral assistance.
One ICRC respondent explained the problem that inevitably confronts aid
workers when political entities take on humanitarian responsibilities. He explained that
when UN human rights investigators started to monitor Darfur by plane, the authorities in
the region started denying humanitarian access to those in need (ICRC:I:3:4). Both
organizations stressed the importance of responding in conjunction with other agencies,
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while also maintaining independence. Organizations must coordinate through open
communication, but humanitarian aid should be left to humanitarian organizations, peacemaking to civil governments, and peace-keeping to militaries.
The United Nations gains support for an integrative approach to conflict situations
from the JEEAR report, as reported in the ALNAP review of Humanitarian Action,
which stated that the ineffective response in Rwanda was due primarily to the lack of
coordination between aid agencies and militaries. Humanitarian aid, in this situation,
“was used as a substitute for, rather than alongside, political and military action”
(Houghton, 2004: 22). In an effort to prevent the disconnect between humanitarian and
military aid from negatively impacting the victims to a conflict, the United Nations is
advocating the politicization of aid. Specifically, state governments are increasingly
making humanitarian aid a part of their overall politico-military agenda.
The impact of such an integrative approach, according to aid agencies, is that
governments sacrifice the humanitarian objective of saving lives in order to further
political goals. Thus, neutral aid agencies, whose objective is to save lives, assert that
humanitarian aid and politics must remain separate. On the other hand, governments,
whose objectives are political in nature, assert that in an effort to be more effective
politically, they must also have humanitarian objectives.
In theory the integration of humanitarian aid and military intervention may seem
like a plausible solution, but there is an obvious lack of political will for intervention
among Western states in the case of Darfur. If aid agencies do not call for military
intervention in an effort to protect neutrality, and militaries are motivated by political
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interests, and do not intervene unless doing so is in their own self interest, then we are
left with a conflict situation in which humanitarians are working to save lives while
oppressive local governments are simultaneously working to end lives.

Genocide and Human Rights
Perhaps one of the most intriguing discussions regarding the principle of
neutrality is the practice of denunciation or calling for military intervention in conflict
situations in the instance of genocide. The MSF Charter states that the organization
“observes strict neutrality and impartiality in the name of universal medical ethics and the
right to humanitarian assistance. . .” (MSF 2005). In its practice, states the former
director of research for MSF-Paris, “MSF has not only engaged in controversies of a
political nature, but has, on occasion, overtly taken sides” (Terry, 2000:2).
Fiona Terry poses the question: “Is it morally acceptable to remain neutral when
faced with genocide or grave violations of human rights?” Abstaining from making a
judgment implies “a legal and moral equality between oppressors and their victims.”
MSF sided with the Afghans during their conflict with the Soviets in the 1980s and with
the non-Khmer Rouge factions during the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. One
way that MSF attempted to confront the dilemmas regarding public denunciation and
neutrality in conflict situations was to include the freedom of denunciation as one of its
guiding principles. Terry argues that it is “ironic that the most frequent argument
invoked against speaking publicly by MSF is that it will violate [its] neutrality, when
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such neutrality might be morally reprehensible.” The other common argument is “a fear
of expulsion” from the conflict area (Terry, 2000:3). However, when public denunciation
gains international attention which leads to aid being superseded, it seems like a plausible
option.
ICRC has been debating the question of whether neutrality necessitates silence
ever since it reviewed its actions during the Second World War. The ICRC remained
silent despite its knowledge of the existence of concentration camps during the Holocaust
“in order to avoid compromising its neutrality and its assistance to prisoners-of-war.”
ICRC recognizes that its silence was a mistake and now claims that it will speak publicly
if four criteria are met. First, there must be “grave and repeated violations of
international humanitarian law.” Second, ICRC must have witnessed the violations firsthand. Third, the ICRC must have attempted bilateral talks with the perpetrators and
failed. And fourth, speaking publicly “must be in the interests of the victims” (Terry,
2000:3).
Genocide. Thus, although both organizations use discretion when speaking
publicly, respondents made it clear that they would do so in extreme situations. I asked
interviewees about the debate over genocide in Darfur. Both ICRC and MSF respondents
explained that they do not characterize conflicts as genocide because it alienates
organizations from the authorities and has very serious legal implications. An ICRC
respondent elaborated saying that the organization “needs to be able to work with the
authorities in order to have access to the people” (ICRC:I:1:7). He continued, saying that
this relationship with the authorities has enabled ICRC to travel throughout Darfur to
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deliver assistance. This rationale seems to contradict the lesson learned after the
Holocaust. Specifically, the organizations do not condemn violators because they do not
want to alienate them. Alienating authorities would cause the authorities to restrict aid
agencies’ access to victims. If authorities are harming victims, it is difficult to believe
that they would be cooperating with the aid agencies in good faith. Thus it seems naïve
of the aid agencies to prioritize their relationship with the authorities so that they can
maintain access and help the victims. ICRC has direct relations with the authorities so it
tends to follow neutrality more strictly to ensure that it has the ability to influence
authorities directly. MSF, on the other hand, does not have the ability to influence
authorities directly so it will risk its relationship with them in the case that it decides to
publicly denounce their behavior.
The ICRC and MSF do not qualify a conflict as genocide because if the term
“genocide” is used, then it would be as though the organizations were calling for an
armed intervention, as the Genocide Convention mandates. ICRC does not call for
military intervention because it is neutral and asserts that humanitarian efforts should be
completely independent of any military intervention (ICRC:I:1:7). ICRC and MSF
respondents warned that one must use caution when using the word “genocide.” If the
term is invoked too often in too many situations, it would lose its grave implications.
However, one must realize that if it is not used when it is warranted, then the act of
committing genocide would go unpunished and the Convention would not be upheld.
The ICRC and MSF explained that they do not characterize a conflict as genocide
because it is not their responsibility, and to do so is clearly beyond either organization’s
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stated mission. According to an ICRC interviewee, “spontaneous and uncoordinated
declarations” would contribute to the creation of a “polemic” which would likely lead
authorities to deny aid organizations access and ultimately harm the victims (ICRC:I:2:9).
Likewise, if genocide goes undeclared, victims will suffer as well. International law
declares genocide “contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned
by the civilized world” (United Nations, 1946). Article I on the UN Charter states that
the “Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in
time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to
punish” (United Nations, 1946). According to the respondents, whether a conflict is
genocide or not can only be determined in a court of law (ICRC:I:1:6), (ICRC:I:2:8)
,(MSF:I:1:4-5), (MSF:I:2:3). However, in order for such a case to ever reach the
International Criminal Court, a conflict must gain attention as a potential genocide. The
signatories to the Convention are all states. Thus, independent organizations, such as
ICRC and MSF are not mandated to prevent and punish genocide. Although both
organizations clearly state that declaring genocide is beyond their scope, MSF did
pronounce Rwanda a genocide. But in the case of Darfur, neither organization thinks the
term applies. It is unclear whether this is an accurate assessment or if the organizations
are refraining from making this judgment to preserve their neutrality. It is impossible to
trust assessments from the aid agencies that assert that they would not use the term
“genocide”.
MSF was one of the first organizations to speak publicly about the political nature
of the Darfur conflict. Specifically, it reported to the international community that this
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was not merely an ethnic conflict, but a civilian uprising against government repression
(MSF:I :3:5-6). Consistent with its mandate to protect international humanitarian law,
the ICRC told the Sudanese authorities and the international community that very grave
violations had occurred (ICRC:I:1:6). The exact stance of the organizations is difficult to
determine from these findings. Both organizations claim that it is not their responsibility
to declare genocide nor are they capable of making such declarations. However, if the
situation were grave enough, the findings suggest that the organizations would address
the issue. ICRC would follow the above-mentioned criteria and MSF would likely use
the media to publicly denounce a situation of genocide.
Human Rights. Both organizations make an important distinction between
violations of international humanitarian law and violations of human rights. International
humanitarian law applies only during times of conflict, whereas human rights abuses can
occur during times of peace. Each organization explained that it would speak out about
violations of international humanitarian law, but does not concern itself with peace-time
human rights violations. However, the Genocide Convention states that genocide can
occur both during times of war and during times of peace. Thus, the distinctions made by
the organization are not as clear in United Nations documents on the topic.
An ICRC respondent states that “the basic rights of dignity and access to security
or protection from the authorities” is where human rights and international humanitarian
law are linked (ICRC:I:4:7). The significance of this statement seems to dilute the
distinction between international humanitarian law and human rights. The respondent
explained that since international humanitarian law protects the basic human rights for
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individuals during times of war, the ICRC is promoting human rights in and through their
promotion of international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions (ICRC:I:4:7).
One ICRC respondent explained that it “requires a great deal of restraint” to
maintain neutrality in a highly politicized environment when “the weak are persecuted by
the strong and millions of defenseless civilians pay the price of ruthless tactics”
(ICRC:I:3:2). Some misunderstand this restraint as “cowardly,” but neutrality is
invaluable because “keeping a low media profile” and gaining “the confidence of all
parties” allows the ICRC to maintain “unimpeded access to those in need all over Darfur”
(ICRC:Liebeskind:2).
As mentioned above, each organization has its own policy for dealing with
violations of international humanitarian law. The ICRC follows a systematic protocol. It
chooses to approach authorities or armed combatants confidentially. The organization
submits written “interventions,” which are documents that describe the violations it has
witnessed, directly to the suspected perpetrator. Although the ICRC does not have
authority to enforce international humanitarian law, one respondent asserts that it has an
“international credibility” and therefore is normally listened to (ICRC:I :4:5, I:1:4).
Within ICRC there is an ongoing discussion about whether the organization
should condemn violators of international humanitarian law publicly, but the conclusions
have always been “that confidentiality [and a] low profile [are its] best options in order to
keep doors open to have access to the victims” (ICRC:I:2:13). In Sudan, the ICRC has
made interventions and discussions have occurred between the ICRC and the national
authorities regarding the situation of the internally displaced persons, and an attack which
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was executed with unnecessary force and without an effort to distinguish combatants
from non-combatants. The strategy now is to make interventions at the state level, in
Darfur. The respondent explains that “those doors are half open” so the organization is
still positive that it will be able to have productive discussions (ICRC:I:3:8-9).
MSF responds differently than ICRC to violations of international humanitarian
law. It does not see silence as a necessary condition of neutrality because by talking
about violations of international humanitarian law, the organization is not taking sides in
the conflict (MSF:I:1:3). However, this does not mean that MSF speaks openly about
every situation of human rights abuses. Human rights abuses occur during times of peace
and are not the responsibility of MSF or ICRC. Violations of international humanitarian
law occur during times of war, and both organizations seek to promote adherence to these
laws. Like ICRC, MSF uses discretion when deciding what situations to expose and
keeps its declarations of abuse to circumstances that violate “respect for civilian life in
the midst of conflict” (MSF:I:1:5). MSF states that when there is an international
presence in a conflict zone, such as an aid organization, the government knows that it is
“in the eyes of the international community” and it is aware that its actions will be
reported if it violates international humanitarian law.
MSF acted on its freedom to denunciate in Darfur once in 2004 and once in 2005.
Both denunciations were in regards to the rape of the women in Darfur. These
denunciations were made because, as one respondent explained, “it is in the mandate of
the Sudanese government to protect the civilian population during a conflict. And MSF
has a mandate to challenge the government to do their job by speaking out” (MSF:I:2:3).
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Another MSF respondent explained that MSF “considers that war is a given”
(MSF:I:3:5). It is not MSF’s mission to decide whether a war is just or not, but it does
feel it needs to take a stand regarding the way in which the war is conducted. This
includes monitoring whether or not international humanitarian law is respected.
Specifically, it looks for whether or not the weapons used are proportional to the
situation. When MSF spoke out about the instances of rape in Darfur, this was a concern
for international humanitarian law, rather than human rights, because rape was used as a
war tactic during a time of conflict.

Political Influences
An ICRC respondent stressed that it is becoming more and more difficult for
humanitarians to be detached from politics, which necessarily affects their neutrality.
An organization’s source of funding impacts its ability to be neutral in a politicized
environment. Many NGOs receive funds from donor states for specific operations. Thus,
even if the organization prefers to be neutral it must deliver aid in accordance with the
donor states’ policies. If an organization’s funding source does not support the
organization’s principles, then it can not put the principles into practice (ICRC:I:4:3-4).
MSF and ICRC have funding sources that enable them to act according to their
principle of neutrality. MSF has funds from states that it uses for projects that the states
request. Additionally it has private funds which make up about 70% of its budget and it
can use them for projects that assert its neutrality such as delivering aid to a group that
the state funds can not support for political reasons. The ICRC receives funds from the
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international community. Because of its status as the promoter of international
humanitarian law, it does not have difficulty attaining the funds it needs to accomplish its
goals. Moreover, because it is protected as a neutral organization, states can not
manipulate the ICRC to act according to the states’ political interests.
According to an ICRC respondent, the ICRC and MSF are essentially the two
organizations that actually follow the principle of neutrality on the ground (ICRC:I:4:7).
The United Nations has a purely humanitarian branch, of which the World Food Program
(WFP) is a part. However, it is strongly influenced by the political wing of the UN which
prevents its ability to remain autonomous from the UN’s interests on the ground
(ICRC:I:4:7). Clearly a number of dilemmas occur when aid agencies come in contact
with organizations that have a political agenda decide on the appropriate level of
coordination depending on how the relationship would impact the perception of the
agencies’ neutrality and whether it would serve the interests of the victims according to
the goals that the organization strives to achieve.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this research I have explored how the principle of neutrality impacts
humanitarian aid agencies’ practice in conflict situations. I have found that aid agencies
define neutrality as simply not taking sides in a conflict (ICRC: I:1:2) (ICRC:I:2:4)
(ICRC:I:4:2) (MSF:I:1:1) (MSF: I:2:1) (MSF: I:3:1). However, the practice of
implementing neutrality is significantly complex. The nature in which neutrality impacts
practice depends in part on the organization’s goals. Thus, neutrality is more often a
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pragmatic means to an end, rather than a theoretical ideal. Additionally, the neutrality of
an organization depends not only on its intention but also on how it is perceived by the
parties to the conflict.
ICRC has the goal of saving the lives of non-combatants living amidst conflict
and promoting international humanitarian law. It accomplishes these goals because it
strictly adheres to the principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality. These
principles enable the ICRC to maintain access to suffering populations. This access
allows the ICRC to aid victims and to know if international humanitarian law is being
respected. Thus, the fulfillment of the ICRC’s mission depends heavily on the pragmatic
means of neutrality.
MSF’s primary goal is to save the lives of victims living amidst conflict and its
secondary goal is to raise awareness about the plight of suffering populations. The
contradictions that arise when trying to accomplish both of these goals generate
conflicting perspectives on the principle of neutrality within MSF. First, there are those
who emphasize the practicality of neutrality which enables the organization to have
access to accomplish the short term goal of saving lives through delivering medical
assistance to the victims. Second, those who emphasize the long-term, life-saving tactics
of preventing oppressive regimes from continuing to harm people, see neutrality as a
theoretical ideal that does not contradict the practice of denunciation. Third, those who
advocate a new humanitarian perspective assert that denunciation does violate neutrality
and MSF should therefore sideline neutrality for a more public advocacy role. Thus, for
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MSF to achieve its primary goal, neutrality seems essential. However, to achieve its
secondary goal, neutrality may be unnecessary or even contradictory.
To ensure the perception of neutrality, while working within a violent and highly
politicized context, MSF and ICRC follow field guidelines to lessen the likelihood that
aid has unintended, negative consequences. These operational guidelines include
delivering aid directly to the beneficiaries, monitoring for aid’s impact, delivering only
that which is necessary when it is necessary and providing assistance that helps the
recipients to become more autonomous. Following these guidelines is a way to heighten
the possibility that, like the organization’s intentions, the impact of its aid is also neutral.
A second way in which aid agencies maintain the perception of neutrality is
through remaining independent in the field. Both organizations stress the importance of
being independent, not only politically, but also from other organizations in the field.
Despite their insistence on independence, if cooperation with other aid agencies, states or
militaries furthers the goal of saving lives without compromising the organizations’
mission, they will work with these other entities. Working with states or militaries with
obvious political interests, implicates the organizations in having a political objective.
Likewise, if organizations work with NGOs that are very outspoken, they could be seen
as officially connected to the NGO’s agenda. Thus, both ICRC and MSF declare that
independence is an invaluable principle in protecting their neutrality and facilitating their
efforts to save lives. Therefore, any cooperative efforts are done on an unofficial basis to
protect the perception of neutrality.
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The United Nations Security Council is growing increasingly supportive of an
integrative approach to conflict situations because of the findings cited in the ALNAP
review of humanitarian action (see page 54). Specifically, it advocates the integration of
humanitarian efforts with military and political efforts. For example, the UN is in favor
of military operations that integrate humanitarian missions into their overall political
goal. According to the ICRC and MSF, this progressively blurs the distinction between
humanitarian space and the politicized war zone. When militaries take on humanitarian
objectives, it confuses recipients. They do not know what the military’s true intentions
are and they can no longer distinguish between armed military personnel delivering aid
and an unarmed humanitarian delivering aid. Consequently, victims of conflict attack aid
workers thinking they are the same individuals running military operations in their
region. Whether the use of military force is motivated by a desire to care for victims, to
reward political supporters, or distract attention from other operations, neither MSF nor
ICRC wants any part in it.
The juxtaposition of the principle of neutrality to the aid agencies’ goals and the
emerging popularity of civil militaries creates tension out of which the following policy
dilemmas arise:
•
•
•

Humanitarian aid agencies are neutral. They do not have political objectives
and therefore refrain from engaging in practices of a political nature.
State governments are increasingly incorporating humanitarian assistance into
their politico-military missions.
Politically motivated militaries and humanitarian-motivated aid agencies
conduct similar operations thus blurring the once clear distinction between
political and humanitarian space.
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•

•

Neutral aid agencies are misidentified by recipients as being connected to the
political agenda of the military. Parties to the conflict may target aid agencies
thinking they are members of a government or military force.
The aid agency is no longer perceived by local authorities or recipients as
neutral and its ability to access suffering populations and distribute aid is
diminished.

This dilemma is intensified by fact that the two primary actors, the aid agency and
the military, do not work together. Additionally, the presence of the military negatively
impacts the ability of the aid agency to accomplish its goals because it leads to the
erroneous assumption that the aid agency is somehow associated with the military efforts.
Conversely, from the military perspective, not having a humanitarian aid component
would negatively impact its ability to accomplish its goals because when militaries are
seen as doing something positive for the victims of conflict, the other potentially negative
political aspects of the agenda are often overlooked.
Thus to resolve the policy dilemma, I assert that the neutral aid agencies and the
governments in the United Nations will have to work together to the extent that they
respect the mission and responsibility of the other. The aid agency is there to provide aid
resources to victims in need, and the military is there to establish and maintain security.
Thus, each entity will understand the role of the other in a conflict zone; however, they
must not collaborate in their efforts in the field because it would negatively affect the aid
agencies’ ability to prove their neutrality. State governments must leave humanitarian
aid to neutral aid agencies.
As discussed earlier, MSF, ICRC and other aid agencies are funded in part by
state actors. Thus, states will have an input in how their resources are used. However,
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states should not use their militaries to distribute aid because local individuals are not
able to distinguish a civil military from an aid agency and may target aid workers because
of the military operation taking place. When confronted with the findings reported in the
JEEAR report, we must not assume that “alongside” military aid means that militaries
should be responsible for distributing humanitarian aid. Additionally, we cannot assume
that the presence of humanitarian aid signifies a corresponding political presence.
The second set of dilemmas that arises concerns the issue of speaking publicly
about violations of international humanitarian law. Aid agencies strive to save the lives
of victims of conflict. They do so in situations where other groups are trying to kill the
same individuals they are working to save. Thus, how can an organization remain neutral
while assisting the individuals that one side of the conflict is trying to harm? Moreover,
how can an organization remain silent about abuses that harm the individuals they are
trying to protect? When aid agencies are working to save victims while others are
working to kill them, they recognize that the impact of their aid is no longer neutral. The
political implications of working in a conflict situation, despite neutral intentions, are
evident in these circumstances. Aid organizations realize that their efforts will likely
have some impact on the political situation, but should they strive to alleviate the political
situation that is harming civilians? Organizations have to weigh the threat to neutrality,
which denunciation can imply, against the threat to victims’ lives, which silence can
ensure. The dilemma can be summarized in the following points
•

Neutral aid agencies are often permitted access to suffering populations. With
this access, neutral organizations gain information about the causes of
suffering.
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•

•

If the organization speaks out, its perception of neutrality is tainted and their
access will be denied in the future. Consequently, it will not be privy to
further information of abuses nor will they be able to assist the victims in
need. Additionally, the ICRC would lose its ability to directly impact the
practices of the abusive regime through confidential meetings.
If the organization does not speak out, states may never put political pressure
on the abusive regimes to change their practices. Thus, abuse may continue
and victims will continue to suffer. However, even if an aid agency does
speak out, it does not guarantee that political pressure will result. Thus, public
denunciation could lead to the denial of aid to victims with no long-term
political change to end suffering.

The question of when it is appropriate to publicly denounce a regime is constantly
debated among humanitarian aid organizations. As discussed earlier there are two main
schools of thought within MSF which are represented in the dilemma above. One side
argues that to denounce a regime leads to the denial of aid for victims without
guaranteeing real change in policy. The other side argues that to continue to aid victims
who are being attacked by their own government is not accomplishing the humanitarian
imperative to save lives in the long run. This is possibly the most pressing dilemma for
humanitarian aid agencies working in today’s conflicts.
When I began this research I agreed with those who advocate speaking out and
working to change the root causes of suffering. As I interviewed staff from the ICRC,
however, I began to recognize the invaluable benefit of having an organization that is
almost always granted access to those who suffer because of its strict adherence to
neutrality. The ICRC is a unique organization, whose role of promoting international
humanitarian law and maintaining access to victims cannot be achieved without being
neutral and confidential. In the case of this organization, I think that the benefits of being
neutral outweigh the potential negative effects of being silent. The ICRC, unlike any
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other aid agency, has the clout to sit down with those who abuse international
humanitarian law and actually influence them to change their practices. It could not do
this if it were to publicly denounce the violators.
Each side of the debate within MSF is compelling for the reasons stated above. I
tend to agree with those who promote advocating for the victims through speaking
publicly about their situation. And although the interviewees down played MSF’s
advocacy role, written reports provide evidence that public denunciation is the
organization’s most common response to violations of international humanitarian law.
My recommendation to both organizations emerges from the discussion about the
involvement of local individuals in the planning and implementation of aid. The practice
of including the local population in this process would potentially impact the community
in the following ways:
•
•

•
•

•

The local leaders would learn how to assess the needs of their community and
strategize the response to these needs.
Aid agencies would use resources more efficiently because local people know
their needs and the local resources that are available better than an outside
group.
Local people will understand the causes of their suffering and will be
empowered through the act of working to meet their own needs.
The skills and sense of empowerment gained in this process will continue
after the aid agency departs. Thus the agency will improve the ability of the
local community to sustain itself in the future.
If suffering populations are empowered, they will be more likely to vocalize
the causes of their suffering and advocate for themselves, thus negating the
need of the organization to violate the principle of neutrality.

This research has shown that humanitarian action is imbued with paradoxes
despite the attempts of aid organizations to consistently adhere to humanitarian
principles. Aid can never be separated from the context in which it is distributed, thus the
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impact of aid will differ even as the intentions remain the same. Aid agencies take on a
crucial responsibility and I challenge those in the field to use the principle of neutrality as
a moral guideline, not an unbendable rule. Organizations must use “practical wisdom”:
“inventing the conduct that most satisfies the exception requested by the victims and least
betrays the rules” (Ricoeur 1989: 1).

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Limitations
The sample size of the research was limited to two organizations. An article by
Farouk Mawlawi (1993), former chief of the Non-Governmental Organizations and
Institutional Relations Section of the U.N. Department of Public Information, suggests
that religious or spiritually oriented NGOs, such as the American Friends Service
Committee, often undertake the task of conflict mediation. Thus, it would have been
beneficial to this study to incorporate a faith-based organization that takes an active role
in conflict resolution.
Pamela Aall (2001) discusses the role of aid agencies in conflict resolution. She
asserts that aid organizations can have an integral role in preparing a conflict situation
that is ripe for negotiations. However, both ICRC and MSF declared their lack of interest
or responsibility in the process of resolving conflict. First, both organizations accept that
conflict is inevitable. The organization’s function, therefore, is to minimize loss of life
from a conflict by promoting international humanitarian law and providing assistance to
victims in need. Furthermore, the concept of conflict resolution is political in nature and
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would implicate the organizations in a political agenda. An ICRC respondent admitted
that it is “very tempting” to take part in negotiations because it is a good idea to have
adversaries sit down and talk, but felt that the risks to neutrality and thus ICRC’s goals
outweigh the benefits (ICRC:I:4:6).
The research is limited because I did not evaluate the practices in the field in
Darfur myself. I relied on the responses of organizations’ staff members and written
reports which always run the risk of being biased. The perception of the organizations as
neutral is important to their function in the world. Thus, when participating in an
interview, it is likely that the individuals responded in a manner that would further the
perception of the organizations neutrality.

Future Research
This research has sparked my interest in other areas of humanitarian aid,
specifically the United States’ military perspective on the integration approach in Iraq. I
have looked exclusively at the perspective of humanitarian aid agencies and political
scientists on the notion of integrating military and humanitarian efforts. But, I would like
to study the military perspective on the coherence approach to humanitarian aid
operations including the impact of participating in a humanitarian mission on individual
soldiers, the perception of military-run humanitarian aid operations by recipients, and
how such operations fit in the larger scheme of the military’s goal in a conflict situation,
specifically Iraq or other instance of invasion.
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APPENDIX A
Interview Schedule
Background
1) Please tell me about your experience with (MSF/ICRC/Aid Organizations)?
2) How long have you worked with (MSF/ICRC/Aid Organizations)?
3) What position have you held in the organization?
4) In which countries have you worked previously?
5) Have you worked with other organizations?
5) Can you tell me about the organizational structure? How are decisions made in
the organization? Do field workers follow guidelines? Do they have autonomy on
the ground or do all decisions come from the headquarters?
6) Can you define the term neutrality for (MSF/ICRC)
a) How does this definition or understanding of neutrality influence the
organization’s policies?
b) How do you see this definition or understanding influencing practice (ie
how is neutrality played out in the field)?
7) Can you define the term political for your organization?
a) How does this definition or understanding of political influence the
organization’s policies?
b) How do you see this definition or understanding influencing practice (ie
how are the organization’s political goals played out in the field)?

Coordination and Collaboration
8) In what ways does the organization interact with other NGOs and/or state
governments when planning and implementing aid responses in Darfur?
9) Are you ever confronted with ideological and operational differences between
NGOs? How do you resolve them?
10) Does the organization coordinate with states to provide security with military
presence?
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11) What are the political implications of these sorts of collaborative efforts?
12) Does collaborating with NGOs and states make it more or less effective in
fulfilling your organization’s goals?
Political Context in Darfur

13) How does the organization perceive its aid as interacting with the political
situation in Sudan?
a) Does aid support one group over the other?
b) Does the organization have political goals? If so, what are they and how
do they plan their aid according?

Unintended consequences of aid
14) Does the organization monitor the impact of aid? Explain
15) Have you ever seen evidence of aid being misused (or supporting unintended
Recipients or efforts) in Darfur?
a) Are their guidelines/policies for what to do if aid is supporting the war
effort?
b) Who makes decisions?
16) Is it ever ethical to remove aid if it is being misused?
a) Have you ever pulled aid out of a situation due to misuse of the
resources?
b) How do the organization’s responses to unintended consequences of aid
reflect its understanding of (or the relevant policies of) the organization as
neutral or political.
Genocide
17) Does the organization try to push the international community towards
recognizing Darfur as genocide? Why or why not?
a) Does the organization have policies on how to address genocide
publicly and on the ground? If so, what are they?
b) What are the organization’s policies concerning political activism?
How is this played out in terms of the current genocide debate?
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c) How has the genocide debate impacted policies on, and practice in,
Darfur?
Human Rights
18) Whose responsibility is it to protect individual human rights? (ie: the
state or the international community)?
a) What are the organizational policies that reflect this view? How are
these policies played out in Darfur?
b) How do the organization’s practices demonstrate its concern for human
rights?
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APPENDIX B
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY

To: __________________

Date________________

From: Nancy Matteuzzi Bruni (Home Phone: (724) 335-3617 Email: nkmb@juno.com)
Re: 1. Description of thesis project: Political Neutrality and Humanitarian Aid: Practical
Implications of Organizational Ideology
2. Consent form to conduct an interview
I recently spoke with you on the phone about the possibility of conducting an
interview with you to gather data for my thesis project. Please review the following
description of my thesis project and the attached consent form. Please feel free to contact
me at the above phone number or email address if you would like me to clarify anything
or to further inform you about any aspect of this process.
Description:
The study will investigate how the different ideological interpretations of the
principle of neutrality affect the practice of traditional versus new humanitarian aid
organizations. Specifically, I will study the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) and Medicines Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders/MSF) in the Darfur
region of Sudan. These two organizations have represented opposing sides at the
forefront of the debate over neutrality.
The genesis of the modern human rights-based solidarity movement can be traced
back to Non-Governmental Organizations’ (NGO) responses to the Biafran famine in
1968. The famine occurred in Southeastern Nigeria as a result of the war for
independence waged by the Biafran people against the government. It was the first real
test for humanitarian NGOs, the first case in which NGOs were responsible for the
majority of the humanitarian aid effort, and the first case that provoked a split between
the ICRC and other major NGOs over the nature of humanitarian action.
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the opposing ideologies impact
the manner in which aid is delivered in conflict situations. Understanding these
differences or similarities is an important step in the process of determining the most
effective and humanitarian means of delivering aid to suffering populations.
I will conduct interviews with members of each organization as well as with
academics in the field. I will tape record the interviews and transcribe them. The
transcriptions will serve as the data for this study. I will then do a qualitative analysis and
search for emerging themes in the data. I anticipate that I will be able to draw conclusions
about the impact of organizational ideology on practice in conflict situations.
Please review the attached consent form.
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Dear Respondents Name,
Thank you for taking the time to review this form and offer your consent if you
agree to participate in a research study concerning the relationship between ideology and
practice in (name of humanitarian organization). I am a graduate student at Duquesne
University in the Center for Social and Public Policy and am conducting this research for
the thesis requirement. The formal title for my thesis project is: Political Neutrality and
Humanitarian Aid: Practical Implications of Organizational Ideology.
Requests
I am requesting an interview with you to gather data for the above mentioned project.
Additionally, I would like your permission to audiotape our conversation and to
transcribe the tape upon completion. I assure you that when I transcribe the tapes, I will
omit any identifiers to protect your identity and the identity of anyone you mention
during the course of the interview. The transcriptions will then serve as the data for my
research and will be made public in my thesis and in discussion with my thesis directors.
Risks and Compensation
You will not face any risks from participating in this research, beyond those of every day
life. Unfortunately, I am not able to pay you for your time; but I will happily provide you
with a copy of the results and final thesis if it is of interest to you. You will not have to
finance any aspect of this project.
Confidentiality
Your name will never appear on any survey or research instrument. Your identity will not
be evident in the data analysis unless you request that I use your name. The tapes will be
stored in a locked file cabinet in my home. The transcripts, without any identifiers, will
be used as the data for the research. The tapes will be destroyed at the completion of the
research.
Right to Withdraw
I would appreciate your participation in this research; however, you are not obligated to
participate. Moreover, you are free to withdraw your consent to participate at any time
and to withdraw information that you have contributed up to that point.
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Voluntary Consent
If you agree to the following statement please sign below:
I have read the above statements and understand what is being requested of me. I also
understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my consent
at any time, for any reason. On these terms, I certify that I am willing to participate in
this research project. I understand that should I have any further questions about my
participation in this study, I may call Nancy Bruni (724-335-3617), her advisor, Daniel
Lieberfeld (412-396-1851), or Dr. Paul Richer, Chair of the Duquesne University
Institutional Review Board (412-396-6326).

_________________________________
Participant’s Signature

______________
Date

_________________________________
Sincerely, Nancy Matteuzzi Bruni
PH: (724)335-3617
422 4th Ave. New Kensington, PA 15068

_______________
Date
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